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BRIEFS

LIBYA, ALGERIA SIGN COOPERATION AGREEMENT--Tripoli, 11 May (JAMAHIRYA NEWS AGENCY)--At the close of the proceedings of the Libyan-Algerian Arab committee's fifth session, Abdalati Alabidi, secretary of the people's committee of the People's Office for Foreign Relations, signed, with Mohamed Ben Yahia, Algerian minister of foreign affairs, an agreement for cooperation in various fields between the Jamahirya and Algeria. This agreement relates to several fields, first commerce, then the iron and steel industries, as well as the chemical and petrochemical industries and the electrical engineering industry, and the food and clothing industries. The agreement also deals with cooperation in the field of information and culture, in particular, education, the popular arts and film exchanges. It likewise deals with cooperation in the field of transport and communications between the different countries, calling for easy and direct relations as well as coordination at the local and international level. The two signatories note with satisfaction the success achieved by the Libyan-Algerian company in the field of sea transport. As for agriculture, the two partners stress the need to initiate students and train technicians as well as to exchange experiences and information in this field. Lastly, the two partners stress very close cooperation in the housing and finance fields. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRYA-PRESS in French 22 May 81 p 5] 9434

CSO: 4519/4

OPEC PRICING POLICY ANALYZED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 11 Jun 81 p 5

[Article by Dr Khaz'al al-Jasim of the Emirates University: "OPEC and Oil Prices"]

[Text] It is important for us to understand the specific nature of OPEC's gains and the specific condition of the circumstances which permitted this limited success.

The OPEC Organization has had nothing to do with the development of the shift in the political and economic power manifested in the negotiations that were carried out with the major corporations, backed by the industrial countries. The shift in power has been cumulative. It was developing during years of major historical powers, and especially of contradictions in the world oil industry. These developments weakened the monopolistic power of the seven sister countries. Among these developments was the emergence of small, independent oil companies which were important, even though they were small, in so far as their influence on the world oil market was concerned. There was also the emergence of the national oil companies which began in Iraq early in the sixties.

The more important developments, however, occurred in the Libyan oil industry and [were manifested in] the willingness of the governments of Iraq, Libya and Algeria to take advantage of these unique and (timely) circumstances which set the stage for the success of the OPEC talks.

Despite the developments of 1971 the conservative trend of some OPEC countries lingered.

Purchase Value

In 1971 the purchasing power of the OPEC members' oil revenues declined, and this caused them to adjust the advertised prices. Negotiations between the OPEC countries and the world oil companies led to an increase in the prices of oil to make up for the loss in actual income that resulted from the decline in the value of the U.S. dollar. This was in accordance with the Geneva Agreement which was reached on 20 January 1971 and which

stipulated that the advertised [oil] prices of six OPEC members in the Arabian Gulf and in the Mediterranean be increased by 8 percent as of 20 January 1972. The agreement also stipulated that in the future prices will be set once every 3 months on the basis of changes in the rate of exchange.

It seems that the nature of the OPEC price negotiations in 1971 was quite different from that of previous negotiations during the sixties.

The Corporations' Tactics

This demonstrates that OPEC has collectively learned its lesson. Negotiations constituted the tactics used by the corporations to slow things down and to be evasive on matters that were being discussed. Consequently, OPEC insisted that these negotiations were not to be subject to such tactics.

To achieve this it is evident that the OPEC countries learned the value of the pressure which political differences among them have in their pursuit of their goal.

There is no doubt that the 1971 negotiations showed a historic shift in political power from the western industrial countries and corporations to a small number of Third World countries which happened to be the principal oil producing countries.

The 1971 talks showed OPEC's first serious attempt to conduct collective bargaining, and the results were not similar to those which governments and corporations faced.

The Reality of the Gains

One may be forced to conclude that the OPEC countries' collective bargaining power depended on changing outside circumstances and not on the fact that OPEC was an independent power capable of developing by itself.

OPEC could have achieved more than that.

And it may be said that the 1971 OPEC talks revealed the possibility of a challenge and not any real shift in power or structure.

Despite inflation the nature of the price increases remained monetary. These price increases did increase the revenues of the oil producing countries, but they left the corporations free to control the industrialization operations and free to get as much profits as they could in the markets which were still under their control.

Although the OPEC decision presented the demands that the general improvement in the conditions of the oil market be reflected [in consumer prices], the actual increases were arbitrary and were not related to these changing conditions.

National Sovereignty

The events of 1972 and 1973 set the stage for the second phase of the change in relations between the oil producing countries and the corporations. The Iraq Oil Company was nationalized; it was the first monopoly that began work in the Arab homeland. Oil was also nationalized in Algeria and in Libya. And the principle of participation by the other members of OPEC emerged. Thus for the first time in the history of the oil industry the pricing power was taken away completely by the oil producing countries. In 1973 and 1974 the advertised price for light Saudi crude rose from 2.59 dollars per barrel early in 1973 to 11.65 dollars per barrel in January of 1974. In 1971 the price had been about 1.80 dollars per barrel.

No matter what, it must be recognized that for the OPEC countries the theory of setting the price of oil is not yet ripe. In fact, it is in its first stage of development.

The Unity of OPEC

On the other hand it may be said that the unity of OPEC has a strong basis and that OPEC may be able to maintain high prices in the future for the following reasons:

1. Pricing, flexibility due to oil demand's low because of the absence of alternatives that can compete with oil at the present time in price.

2. The similarity of the product (oil). If an OPEC country wanted to reduce its oil prices a little, the result would be a reduction in revenues. Therefore, all the oil producing countries have a common interest in preserving the unity of OPEC so that they would not get trapped into a deadly competition from which only the consuming, industrial countries would benefit.

3. The costs of producing oil in the OPEC countries are similar. This is true to a greater extent in the countries of the Arabian Gulf.

4. The number of OPEC members is small (13 countries). It is this that helps coordination and agreement on price and product.

5. The OPEC [countries] must realize that they are weak, developing countries that cannot haggle separately with the giant oil corporations or with the industrial countries. The OPEC countries have an urgent need for cooperation and unity to confront the major corporations, which are backed up by their governments, from a stronger bargaining position.

The Point of Weakness

OPEC's principal weakness, however, lies in the high degree of disparity in the political and economic structures of the member countries. This is what was evident in all the numerous OPEC meetings where the differences between the countries were broad, and no agreement was reached on dividing

the quotas of production among the member countries. Limiting the price of oil has to be accompanied by a policy that limits the production of member countries.

Production and Population Density

From a practical and theoretical standpoint the oil countries that have low energy consumption, a small population and a high per capita income are Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Libya and Saudi Arabia which may be willing and able to reduce their production to maintain high prices.

Countries with a relatively larger population where per capita income is low may be less willing and politically less able to reduce oil production to any large degree. These countries may dodge OPEC prices and go around them by selling their oil at prices less than OPEC prices so they can maintain their oil revenues.

Price and Depleting Sources

It is important for one to understand that raising the prices of oil must lead to [the following]:

--Encourage more maintenance measures on the part of consumers.

--Encourage the development and utilization of energy alternatives such as coal, solar energy, etc.

This measure puts into practice the theory that over time the price of depletable sources is to be fixed. For as oil reserves decline because of depletion, oil prices have to be raised so that oil consumption can be reduced and oil can remain available for industry for the longest possible period. This measure also encourages the development of other energy alternatives.

According to this analysis it is assumed that the members of OPEC have to set the price of oil at a level that would enable them to maximize their earnings, in accordance with the economic understanding--if they behave rationally and in accordance with economic principles. This means that the price of oil will depend on the degree of OPEC's unity. If OPEC does not succeed in continuing its price policy because some of its members do not abide by the production quotas or by the published price that had been agreed to, we can expect a decline in the price of oil, competition in increasing production and, consequently, a decline in OPEC's oil revenues. Ultimately, OPEC's unity would be shattered.

Early in 1980 OPEC oil prices differed sharply, varying between 26 dollars per barrel and 37.20 dollars per barrel.

The Power of Solidarity

It is with some risk, however, that we say that OPEC understands such

results and that [it understands that] without its unity and solidarity it will not be able to achieve its present gains which were achieved for the first time in four centuries of the history of the struggle between the industrial countries and the countries that were subordinate to them.

We may assume that a large reduction in price is unlikely and that oil prices in the near future will be set basically by the relative powers of the bargaining positions of OPEC and the industrial, consuming countries. If OPEC succeeds in reaching an agreement over dividing production quotas--and this seems unlikely in OPEC's present circumstances--and perhaps reducing [those quotas], oil prices can be kept high for a long period of time.

In order for OPEC talks to be successful, OPEC members with a low intake capacity have to be willing to reduce their oil production relatively more than the members who have a relatively high intake capacity.

[illegible]
[illegible]

OFFICIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES ANNOUNCED

Railroad, Land Reform Projects

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 22 Jun 81 p 3

[Text] KABUL, June 22 (Bakhtar) — The Council of Ministers of the DRA has approved an agreement on a railway line project, initiated between Afghanistan and the French Company, Solve-rail.

According to the decision adopted by the Council at its meeting held on June 20 under the chairmanship of Sultan Ali Keshtmand, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the French Company will lay the railway line route in the area of Kemal Khan Dam as per the guiding materials and technical information which will be placed at its disposal.

Also approved at the meeting was another important document, the joint decision of the Politburo of the PDPA CC and the Council of Ministers on continuation of the implementation of the democratic land reforms in Afghanistan.

According to this decision, the work for accomplishing the democratic land reforms aimed at eliminating all feudal and prefeudal remnants and vestiges in the social and national relations in the country, limiting the landholdings of big landlords and securing land to landless peasant families and those having small holdings, and to nomads and agricultural workers, raising the level of national economy, raising the standard of living of the people, promotion of the national culture of Afghanistan and democratisation of the socio-political life in the country will be continued.

The meeting approved a contract for the purchase of materials and equipment for power grids from the German Democratic Republic at a cost of nine million dollars which had earlier been initiated between the DRA and the GDR.

The Council approved the reorganisation of the Department of Work and Social Security.

Also approved were a number of agreements regarding the purchase of materials and equipments from friendly countries needed by the department and state enterprises. The council in order to ensure provision of the primary commodities to the working people on easy terms, decided that a Department of the Development of Consumer Cooperatives and Handicrafts be established within the framework of the Commerce Ministry.

On the basis of the memorandum of PDPA CC, dated May 1980, for the provision of necessary facilities and improvements of affairs related to the Hairatan port, the Council decided to transfer the Kuldar sub-district and Hairatan port from the jurisdiction of the Samangan province to the administrative jurisdiction of the capital of the Balkh province as its sub-district.

Bank Savings Campaign

Kab-1 KABUL NEW TIMES in English 21 Jun 81 p 3

[Text] In this year's Da Afghanistan Bank's raffle the first prize went to the holder of Account No 31056 to M. Halim of Kabul.

In an interview with the Kabul New Times, Sardar Mohammad, Director-General of the Saving Accounts department of the bank, said, that the number of new saving accounts in the bank during 1359 had reached 3,222 and another 4,928 new saving accounts were opened during the year 1358. This showed a increase of 1,706 more accounts in comparison to the previous year. Altogether, by the end of year 1359 the number of new accounts had reached to 49,181.

Sardar Mohammad said, the total amount of money allocated for the lottery for 480 accounts in 1359 was 300,000 Afs. Though the number of accounts that met the raffle conditions were 31,706, the bank had raffled for only 480 accounts. The first prize amounted to 200,000 Afs. The prizes of the winner had been credited in the respective account numbers and are available to the holders.

The idea behind arranging of such lottery schemes and distribution of huge sums of money every year to the account holders is to encourage the people to take more interest in their banks and open more accounts. Keeping of money in the banks, are both in the benefit of the account holders and the bank itself. The banks are secure places for money. The account holders benefits from the interests extended by the banks. They also make use of the yearly lottery for a great many of accounts. The bank, with this money finds itself in a better financial position and can extend credits to the productive institutions and factories, and thus provide good services to the growth of the economic sector of the country.

The unprecedented improvement in raffles for the saving accounts in 1359 has been the result of the great increase in the opening of saving accounts and the result of hard and speedy work performed by the officials of the bank. Healthy propaganda to encourage the public to open saving accounts has also played its role. Meanwhile, the raffles of the accounts last year took place almost eight month earlier than the previous years. At present, around 20 to 30 new accounts are opened daily with Da Afghanistan Bank. This indicates the great increase in the daily activity of the department.

The department of the saving account, he added, despite the daily increasing burden of work, has tried its best to perform its duties in the best manner and has always conducted its activities to the satisfaction of its clients. Around 400 to 500 clients refer daily to this department.

As a result of the increasing current and saving account numbers during last year, the scope of the activity of the saving account department has enormously expanded. This is a clear sign of the reliable and hard work performed by the personnel of the department. In 1359 around 500 current account and 184 non-interest saving accounts have been newly opened for state offices, state enterprises, and companies, among others. This excludes the 13 branches of the bank functioning in different parts of the city.

He added, the raffle for the saving accounts of the 71 provincial branches of the bank will soon take place in the centre of the bank in Kabul.

The money allocated for the lottery to the saving accounts is, in fact, part of the expense of the bank and is being accounted for on the debit side of the balance sheet. But plays a vital role in the boosting of the activities and increases the number of the accounts. Arranging of raffles and award of big prizes to the

winners has greatly enhanced the flow of idle money to the bank during the recent years. The management of the bank intends to further improve the system of lottery and add more money as prizes in an effort to encourage the compatriots to open more accounts in the bank.

CSO: 4600/50

ISLAMIC AFFAIRS CHIEF PRAISES NATIONAL FRONT

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 18 Jun 81 p 3

[Text] Now the establishment of the Vast National Fatherland Front, which has stemmed from the national and traditional jirgahs of our patriotic people, can be discussed as the social and political foundation of our society. The National Fatherland front is designed as a driving force for strengthening and defending the national independence, national sovereignty and economic independence and bringing about drastic and radical changes".

These remarks came from Dr Saed Afghani, President of the Islamic Affairs, member of the Central Council of the Union of Writers and poets of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and member of the High Commission for the Founding Congress of the National Fatherland Front, in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

"The front came into being at the initiative of our revolutionary Government. It is composed of the representatives of all the tribes and nationalities and the national and patriotic forces of Afghanistan. It is expected that the front will probe in a better manner the problems and difficulties facing Afghanistan today", he said.

"The front is a strong means and instrument for the development and construction of revolutionary Afghanistan and eliminating the obstacles created against our progressive regime. The objective behind the establishment of the front is therefore good and in the interest of the people. No doubt it will lead to public satisfaction".

SOCIAL JUSTICE

"The glorious Saur Revolution", he went on, "which has been staged in the interest of the people of Afghanistan will succeed further with the help and cooperation of the front. In the light of this front, the new society void of exploitation of man by man will be built. The front can prevent social injustice and exploitation of man by man".

"The role of the intellectuals and enlightened elements in the unity and solidarity of the national and patriotic forces is very great", he stressed. "The intellectuals and patriots are willing to sincerely serve their people and prepare favourable ground for the peace, security, prosperity and tranquility of the people. This is so not only in our country but also all over the world".

"The establishment of the front", he said, "at this important period of our history has been the long-cherished desire of our people for realising their social aspirations. Now that the people of Afghanistan have established the front, it is certain that large and important services will be rendered in the interest of the working people of revolutionary Afghanistan".

"Under the present circumstances, the establishment of the front as an historical need will play a great role in the getting the national and patriotic forces united. The main purpose behind the establishment of the front is to ensure the unity of all the people of Afghanistan including various tribes, nationalities, workers, peasants and the patriotic forces".

"The importance of the front", he added, "is clear to all those who can analyze the situation and the role of this front in the building of the society".

"The usefulness of the front depends on the magnitude and dimension of political consciousness and activeness of its members. However, it is a great event of exceptional in the life of the people of Afghanistan. Its role in the building of the country is highly valuable. The establishment of the front will serve as a strong weapon and force to foil the designs of imperialists. History shows that the imperialist and colonial designs will be frustrated in this country as was the case in the past", he asserted.

"History shows, Afghani went on, "that the jirgahs were held in Afghanistan in the past to fight and combat the schemes of British colonialism. The British have always been defeated under the decisions taken by the traditional and tribal jirgahs and loya jirgahs of Afghanistan".

"These jirgahs and loya jirgahs were usually held at a time when shocking events threatened the existence of the people of Afghanistan", he recalled.

"Likewise Loya Jirgahs were held and adopt the constitutions of the country".

"Tribal jirgahs", he said, "are held in Afghanistan at different levels. The people of Afghanistan are prepared to implement the decision of these jirgahs by making every sacrifice possible".

"We wish that the disorder which was brought about as a result of the anti-national moves and acts of Amin will be healed by the wise and just policy of the party and the DRA Government. It is hoped that the National Fatherland Front will prepare a good ground for mutual understanding, peace and progressive moves in free and revolutionary Afghanistan", Afghani said.

CSO: 4600/49

KARMAL ANNOUNCES FOUNDER MEMBERS OF NATIONAL FRONT

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 20 Jun 81 p 2

[Text] It is clear that the efforts of the workers and the vast masses of the people should be organized and integrated in a common rank toward a single aim for the formation of a new and blossoming society in Afghanistan. This is the most important condition of acquiring it and this is one of the most important problems for the time being.

The patriots of Afghanistan clearly realise and understand their duties in the prevailing state of affairs. They are becoming united ever more closer around the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, this recognized vanguard of the working class and all the working people and the guiding force of the society and the state. They constantly raise their level of consciousness, organization and discipline. In a short span of time congresses and conferences of trade unions, cooperatives, democratic organization of Afghanistan's youth, democratic organization of Afghanistan's women, unions of writers, journalists and artists were successfully convened. In the course of huge mass meetings the loyalty of the patriots of Afghanistan to the cause of social and national progress of Afghanistan and their full support of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and their Revolutionary Government were manifested clearly and explicitly.

Th jirgahs (assemblies) of the tribes of Afghanistan were convincing manifestations of the unity of national and patriotic forces. In these trustworthy jirgahs, the heads, leaders and individuals from tribes who have played a proud and important role in the history of the country expressed in unambiguous terms and explicitly their full understanding of the policies of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the revolutionary Government, in the context of the efforts for the consolidation and expansion of the transformations aimed at ensuring all-round progress of the country. There is no doubt that the nationalities and tribes of Afghanistan will occupy a worthy and befitting place in the alliance of the national and patriotic forces.

MOSLEMS

The deeply national and democratic Saur Revolution is a powerful manifestation of the will of the toiling Moslems of Afghanistan for the stabilization of real social justice. The religious scholars, mullahs and noble and patriotic spiritual leaders contribute befittingly to the common task of constructing a new and blossoming Afghanistan and the unity of patriotic Moslems who form the decisive majority of the people.

The fruitful, beneficial and constructive cooperation in the interest of the advancement of the country is successfully developing between the Governmental organs and the patriotic national industrialists in the framework of the Economic Consultative Council under the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Practically one can observe in the country the general activization of socio-political life on the basis of legality, trust and confident cooperation between the patriots and the religious, national and social forces.

It is these forces that constitute the decisive majority of the people of Afghanistan and have decisively positioned themselves in the path of future of social justice and all-round progress.

It is on this basis that, before our eyes, extensive unity of people, real union and effective cooperation of these forces is coming into being. Thus the historical aspirations of the best sons of the people regarding the deep and sincere unity of all patriots of the country are transforming into reality.

MEMBERS

The collective founder-members of the National Fatherland Front of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are as follows:

—People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

—Trade unions of Afghanistan.

—Unions of cooperatives of Afghanistan.

—Democratic Organisation of Afghanistan's Youth.

—Democratic Organisation of Afghanistan's Women.

—Union of Journalists of Afghanistan.

—Union of Writers of Afghanistan.

—Union of Artists of Afghanistan.

—Organisation of Peace, Solidarity and Friendship of Afghanistan.

—Economic Consultative Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

—Council of Scholars and Religious Leaders of Afghanistan.

—Jirgah of Tribal Representatives.

Let me express my heartfelt thanks on behalf of the High Preparatory Commission and on behalf of you esteemed delegates to all the founding members of the National Fatherland Front and express my confidence that their noble initiative will be manifested worthily and develop properly in their direct activities within the framework of the congress.

Thus the task of the creation of the broad unity of the compatriots of Afghanistan in practice emanate from the whole complex of social, political and economic conditions.

The fact of the convocation of the founding congress of the NFF in the new phase of the Saur National Democratic Revolution in itself brings out in relief the great and favourable possibilities and the prospects of achieving such unity.

Now we must begin to materialize these possibilities. We create the NFF on the basis of a clear realisation of its aims and tasks.

Esteemed delegates,

Now we come to the latest problem, that is to say, wherein lies the political significance of the creation of the NFF.

If we sum up what we have said, the conclusion will be that the creation of the NFF is not a simple increase in the number of the socio-political organisations which have been formed already and are in action, even though this organisation will be the largest of them.

The importance of the formation of the National Fatherland Front as far as the principle is concerned is very great.

First of all it must be said that this event is a new and convincing evidence of the general normalization of the situation in our country, the consolidation of our revolutionary Government, the confidence and the respect accorded to it by the vast masses and in fact all our free and industrious people.

POWERFUL

Secondly, the formation of the front is the manifestation and powerful expression of the consolidating and developing unity of the national patriotic forces of Afghanistan on the basis of the principles of the Saur Revolution, the policy of the PDPA and the endeavours of the patriots and the fighters in the struggle for constructing a prosperous and blossoming Afghanistan.

Thirdly, the formation of the front means an important stride towards the integrity and fraternity of the broadest social and national forces of Afghanistan, on a democratic basis and on the foundations of respect and consolidation of the rights and social freedoms of man.

With this step the possibilities will increase for every compatriot of Afghanistan to participate adequately in the blossoming of the country and this participation will be broadened further in the framework of the vast popular and democratic organisation of the NFF.

Fourthly, the formation of the front shows clearly and explicitly that the glorious Saur Revolution is capable in this phase of solving big and complicated problems and of creating completely new forms of the unity of all national and compatriot forces.

Solving these problems we the patriots of Afghanistan will prepare ourselves for the accomplishment of the future tasks in connection with the achievement of our main goal i.e., the construction of a society of social justice, progress and prosperity in Afghanistan.

Esteemed delegates,

With the creation of the National Fatherland Front we have taken an extraordinarily important step towards the national and social unity and integrity.

But this is one of the first steps and a great historical beginning in that direction. Of course, the organisational formation and the practical construction of the front is very important. But ensuring its efficiency of action, that is, the turning of the front into a constituent and necessary unit of the sociopolitical system of the country is also not less important.

The front should be turned into what it should be i.e., in an effective alliance of the patriots of the homeland for the prosperity and the progress of the country. Thus, with the creation of the front and while defining its aims and functions and its organisational structure, we must pay attention to it that the work of the front should have a real and proper content.

The front which is formed in accord with the demands of the life must be a legal and effective means of changing and transforming this life towards well-being and prosperity.

Long live the unity of the national and patriotic forces of Afghanistan!

Long live the National Fatherland Front.

Victory will be ours.

CSO: 4600/49

AFGHAN-CZECH RELATIONS LAUDED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 23 Jun 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The official and friendly visit of Babrak Karmal General Secretary of the PDPA CC, President of the Revolutionary Council and President of the Presidium at the head of a high party and government delegation, to the friendly country of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia is a manifestation of the growing close friendship and solidarity existing between the peoples of the two countries.

Babrak Karmal is making this important and historic visit at the invitation of Gustav Husak, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovak Socialist Republic the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Government of Czechoslovakia.

The relations between Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia have been friendly for long years. These friendly relations have been based on mutual understanding, cooperation, non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, mutual respect for the national sovereignty and national independence of others.

The Afghan-Czech relations have developed more in the interests of the peoples of the two countries after the victory of Saur Revolution and especially its new evolutionary phase.

It is gratifying to note that the government of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia has assisted Afghanistan in implementing a good number of development projects undertaken in the benefit of the hard working people of Afghanistan.

A well-developed industrial country in Central Europe, Czechoslovakia has abundant mineral and natural resources. These resources have been widely exploited by the hardworking people of Czechoslovakia after the progressive programmes were worked out and undertaken by the progressive regime established in that country under the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Since 1948 when all power was taken over by the working class in Czechoslovakia represented by the Communist Party, revolutionary changes have taken place in that country. New social order has been set up in the interest of the entire people of that country. The main means of production have been nationalized and the principle of cooperative ownership prevails in agriculture. The social ownership of the means of production in industry and agriculture have helped in introducing great changes in the social and economic life of the people of Czechoslovakia.

The plans undertaken by the party and government of Czechoslovakia aim at systematically boosting up production in the industry and agriculture.

The development efforts made by the hard working people of Czechoslovakia are directed towards the fulfillment of the high goals of socialist construction and meeting the need of a growing society

The participation of Czechoslovakia in CMEA guarantees t..e effective development of her economy At the same time the membership of CSSR in CMEA provides a factor for participation of Czechoslovakia in the development efforts carried out by the member countries

We note with pleasure and happiness that since the victory of Saur Revolution and especially its new evolutionary phase several cooperation agreements have been signed between the governments of both countries these agreements will contribute to the development of social and economic fields in the Revolutionary Afghanistan

It is hoped that the official and friendly visit of the high party and government delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to the friendly country of Czechoslovakia will open a new chapter in the history of the good friendly relations existing between the two countries

BRIEFS

EFFORTS TO DE-EMPHASIZE FOREIGNERS--To reduce Bahrain's dependence on foreign labor, official bodies have decided on two approaches. The first is to encourage the employment of Bahraini women in various jobs, with the goal of raising the proportion of female workers from the current level of 10 percent of the workforce in Bahrain. The second is to train 10,000 Bahrainis currently in the workforce to raise their competence in the next 10 years in the context of creating intermediate and high level technical staffs which are capable of replacing foreigners and training their compatriots who come into the labor market. Progress in these two directions is urgent, since 70,000 people in the workforce in Bahrain are foreigners, and half of them, roughly 35,000, are from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. /Text/ /Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 6 Jun 81 p 49/ 11887

CSO: 4304/30

BAKHTIAR'S ROLE IN OPPOSITION MOVEMENT ANALYZED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 17 Jun 81 pp 5-8

[Text] The fall from grace of Iran's president Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr provides Shapur Bakhtiar, leader of the exiled National Resistance Movement of Iran, with both his greatest opposition groups and with his greatest test, say many Iranian and foreign observers.

If he can persuade the majority of the other opposition leaders in Europe to co-operate with him and concede to him a position of leadership then the chances of the exiles to influence events at home could be hugely increased, some observers say. If he fails to make some public bid for this role now, or cannot, at least, generate new hope among the exiles that following Bani-Sadr's eclipse he has something positive to offer then he risks what could be a really disastrous loss of face.

Factors in Bakhtiar's favour, the observers point out, include the fact that he is still top of the list of exile leaders who are reviled by regime propaganda inside Iran, a fair reflection that they fear his influence more than even that of the monarchists. Groups like the Mojaheddin-e-Khalq, who see themselves as having an excellent chance of taking over in Iran in future, also put Bakhtiar at the top of their vituperation list, pointing to them also seeing him as the most dangerous rival.

The second big point in Bakhtiar's favour is that he has not, in spite of his attacks on the previous regime in Iran, completely alienated the monarchists and he had preserved a dialogue with the Imperial family and its group in Cairo. This is important for there is undoubtedly a strong grass roots attachment to the monarchy still among the exiles in particular and even back in Iran, where it is more muted.

Rival leaders like Ahmed Madani and Hassan Nazih are more committed Republicans, it is thought, and the fact that they cooperated with the Khomeyni regime means they cannot hope to attract the loyalty of exiles who have lost relatives and livelihoods. But they could play an important role in a national reconciliation movement if they display the patriotism and political acumen needed. An additional point in Bakhtiar's favour, of course, is the fact that he was a consistent critic of what he felt were injustices under the late Shah's regime and went to prison for his beliefs. Foreign observers are also ready to praise him for his undoubted courage, both in his bid to avert collapse by taking the premiership in the last weeks of the Shah's reign and in not being cowed into

silence and inertia by threats from Tehran, as happened with the vast majority of his exiled compatriots. This in spite of several attempts on his life.

Reports that another leading opposition figure in former premier Ali Amini has agreed to cooperate with Bakhtiar in helping weld together a strong opposition were welcomed by most Iranians in exile. While Amini was not a noticeably successful premier and contrived to make himself a great number of enemies--not a difficult job, many people will say, even if you hold even a minor office among Iranians--he was the most constructive and sane voice among all those heard during the final months of the last Shah's reign. And many people believe that if the Shah had listened to him and acted on his advice early enough he might well have saved the day.

An Iranian closely connected with the Imperial Court told friends that when he was with the late monarch immediately after Amini's final meeting with him, the Shah told him, "He (Amini) only wants to be the president of Iran." People give little credence to this opinion, believing that Amini's role in those days was sincere and could have been effective. "Indeed," said one Iranian observer, "I don't think many people inside Iran were thinking about becoming president at that time, though there may have been a few who thought they might become Shah! It is only since everyone went into exile that hundreds of bright young men have seen themselves as future presidents. Nowadays they are thick on the ground."

Criticisms levelled against both Bakhtiar and Amini have included suggestions that they are manipulated to a degree by the ambitions of those who surround them. Bakhtiar is said to have been bedeviled by currents pulling him towards and away from the monarchy and to be prone to being influenced by conflicting views from time to time, leading him to take unconsidered decisions and make imprudent statements. Amini, it is said, is an old man who may not see that younger more energetic people are anxious to use him and his reputation to ride to power themselves.

All these things, observers point out, are part and parcel of ordinary political life and a leader must be able to appreciate and handle them. In Bakhtiar's case his weaknesses appear to be largely related to his lack of understanding of the part public relations play in political life. He showed after the criticism of him blew up after the Iraqi war broke out that he either lacked the acumen or the apparatus to deal with this. And on a number of occasions he has made unpolitic remarks that have aroused unnecessary resentment among those he has attacked.

The dispute between him and Princess Azadeh Shafiq, daughter of the late Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf, who runs an active and enthusiastic young pro-monarchist group with its own newspaper in Paris, is a reflection of the lack of flexibility and tact that mars his public relations.

Smarting from criticism in her newspaper IRAN-E-AZAD he retorted that Princess Shafiq had no right to meddle in Iran's affairs because she was not even Iranian--a reference to the fact that her father was an Egyptian. This not

only served to upset the many Iranians who know the princess to be a genuine, decent patriot but also reflected a pettiness that ill becomes a political leader.

The princess' continued campaign against Bakhtiar since has detracted from the effectiveness of her efforts. A recent report that her mother, Princess Ashraf, refused to intervene to end the unpleasantness the attacks were creating also disappointed many exiles who had hoped that mature attitudes would prevail among all contending sides.

Princess Ashraf herself, in spite of being top of the hit list of the present regime in Tehran, has at least set an example to the cowardly majority of former high officials of the late Shah's regime who have hidden themselves away with their wealth on the excuse that their lives were endangered. She has put her money where her mouth is, as the saying goes, and has hit back at her brother's detractors and at people like UN secretary Kurt Waldheim who have demonstrated that their personal ambitions can outweigh moral considerations in the way they carry out their jobs.

Waldheim's joining in the chorus of criticism of the regime of the late Shah, who contributed a fortune to the world body's finances in the last decade of his reign, was seen by many Iranians as helping condone the continued slaughter of their compatriots by the Tehran regime over the last two years.

The issue that Bakhtiar had to face, of course, was that there was widespread resentment against the Pahlavi family among the Iranians in exile as well as back in Iran. Propaganda had painted the family's record in the blackest terms, and the majority of Iranians had been able to see, if not to directly suffer, from the way many financial advantages had been taken by the family's hangers-on in their names. When the feeling that the late Shah had abandoned many of his friends to their fate through his inaction during the last few months of his reign became widespread support for the monarchy fell away rapidly.

Until now Bakhtiar has managed to walk the tightrope of appearing to have an open mind on monarchy as well as remaining loyal to his former social democratic colleagues and ideals. But the press which he has backed or set up has failed in its efforts to put over his point of view and explain his difficulties and has frequently proved a divisive influence. His press and public relations have been conducted without flair. And he has failed to establish the kind of organisation that could bring young people and many other idealists into his camp in an active and meaningful way. His organisation has continued on the lines of a private company rather than a political body with participation of its supporters on the ground.

The result is that his future must now depend to a great extent on the other exile groups, or at least a proportion of them, agreeing to cooperate with him. If the idea of a National Reconciliation Council, mooted by Ali Amini, and referred to in statements as if its composition has already been agreed, has really attained some sort of fruition, then Bakhtiar now has to ensure he has his rightful place in it on the strength of his personal standing alone. Had he really developed a practical popular base any future council would have had to consider him before any other and his influence would have been paramount.

He may still be able to achieve this. Much will depend on Bakhtiar's ability to be more flexible in his approach and to widen the scope of the people to whom he listens. Among his aides he can spread a stronger realisation that they are there to serve a cause rather than behave like commercial company representatives. As one observer commented, "Bakhtiar still has a great well of support that has been suppressed by his inability to answer emotionally to it. The failure is perhaps more that of his aides than of he himself, for they seem to have been very mute disciples. But after all, it is he who has the ambition to help his country and his people and he should see they work to help him to that end instead of indulging in their own digressions. He must sometimes envy the zeal of Khomeyni's minions when he assesses the achievements of his own."

CSO: 4600

PAHLAVI REGIME PROPAGANDIST IS EXECUTED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Jun 81 p 1

[Text] According to the verdict issued by the first branch of the Central Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal, 'Ali Asghar Amirani was condemned to death for the crime of maintaining relations with Israel and for cooperation with SAVAK. The sentence against him was carried out today at dawn in the Evin prison compound.

According to the indictment issued by the tribunal, he was convicted of being affiliated and maintaining close and multifaceted cooperation with the royal family and associates of the despot, of strengthening the hated Pahlavi regime, of cooperation and close relations with Israel, of cooperation with the dissolved SAVAK and of declared partnership and cooperation with the executed Nassiri and other criminal agents of the declining regime, of preparing deviationist articles and of extensive propaganda in favor of the vile regime, dating from before the 19 August 1953 coup d'etat until the fall of the hated Pahlavi regime.

'Ali Asghar Amirani had been arrested once last summer and released, and was subsequently arrested again by the strike force of the Public Prosecutor's office. His trial opened at the first branch of the Central Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal in October last year.

Amirani's trial ended after a number of sessions; he was sentenced; and finally, he was shot at dawn today for his affiliation with the former regime and for cooperating with the regime occupying Jerusalem.

Amirani's corpse was transferred today to the Central Tehran Morgue.

CSO: 4640/25

DR ALI SHARIATI'S BACKGROUND, PHILOSOPHY OUTLINED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 21 Jun 81 p 4

[Text] The late Dr Shairan was a hard working writer, a committed intellectual eager to convey his message, and at the same time he possessed great genius and creativity. He always had something new to say or to write, so that it is not possible to present here all of his works and ideas. The only correct method for gaining an understanding of him is to refer directly to the writings that he left behind in the course of his brief but active life. The number of his lectures, discussions, answers to questions, sociological and historical analyses and writings, runs into the hundreds. Most of them have been frequently reprinted at home and abroad, in thousands of copies, taken together, they form a sort of "Encyclopedia of Islam." A glance at the titles of his works and lectures will show that he was always looking for new topics and subjects and his mind never ceased its creative activity. His guiding light was the pure Islam of its first devoted adherents and the Auran. Despite the number of his writings, he seldom repeated any subject, and it is therefore necessary to refer to all that he wrote in order fully to appreciate his thought. Here we mention the titles of a few of his works in order to honor his memory--the memory of a brief life lived with firm faith that created a new current of thought among the educated youth, both in university and traditionalist circles.

May his soul rest in peace.

Abu Dharr Ghaffari, translation, Mashhad, 1335 1956.

Alawi Shvism and Safavi Shvism, lecture at Husayniya-yi Irshad.

Ali, A Truth Shrouded in Legend, lecture at Husayniya-yi Irshad.

Ah, the Perfect Man, lecture at Husayniya-yi Irshad.

Ah, The School of Unity and Justice, lecture printed by Husayniya-yi Irshad. Azar 1348 1969.

Allama Iqbal, congress in commemoration of Iqbal held at Husayniya-yi Irshad.

Appointment With Abraham, lecture given at the University of Mashhad on the philosophy of the hajj.

Approaches to the Understanding of Islam, lecture at Husayniya-yi Irshad, 1347 1968.

Approaches to the Understanding of Islam, second lecture at Husayniya-yi Irshad, 9 Aban 1347 1968.

Art in Expectation of the Promised One, lecture at the University of Mashhad.

Belief in Science, lecture at the University of Mashhad.

Civilization and Renewal, lecture given to the society of social science teachers at Khorasan.

Culture and Ideology, lecture at the Teachers' Training College, Tehran, printed by Husayniya-yi Irshad.

The Economic and Class Roots of the Renaissance, lecture at the Commercial High School.

Existentialism, lecture at the National University.

The Extraction and Refinement of Cultural Resources, lecture at the Petroleum College, Abadan.

Father, Mother, We Are Accused, lecture at Husayniya-yi Irshad.

Fatima the Unique, lecture on the role of woman in Islam, first given at Husayniya-yi Irshad, 1350 1961.

The First Blossoming of Islamic Spirituality in Iran, translated from the French of Louis Massignon.

The Four Prisons of Man, lecture given at Pedagogical High School.

"From Migration to Death," part of the book Muhammad, Seal of the Prophets, vol. I, published by Husayniya-yi Irshad.

From Where Shall We Begin? lecture given at Aryamehr University, printed by Husayniya-yi Irshad.

A General Syllabus of Islamology, 19 lessons, 1350/1971.

The History of Religions, duplicated at the Faculty of Letters, Mashhad.

Husayn, the Heir of Adam, lecture given at Husayniya-yi Irshad, Ashura 1349/1970.

If Ali Had Said Yes, lecture at Husayniya-yi Irshad.

In Answer to Some Questions and Criticisms, talk given at Husayniya-yi Irshad with the participation of Muhammad Taqi Shariati and Sadi Balaghi.

The Intellectual and His Responsibility, lecture at Husayniya-yi Irshad.

Islamology, vol. 1, Mashhad, 1317 1968.

Kavir: History in the Form of Geography, Mashhad, 1349 1970.

Lessons in Tauhid, the History of Religions and Schools of Sociology, a collection of 25 lessons given at Husayniya-yi Irshad.

"Let Us Arise and Advance," lesson 20 of Islamology, 1350 1970.

The Machine in the Captivity of Machinism, lecture at Aryamehr University.

Man in Modern Civilization, lessons in the history of civilization given at the Faculty of Letters Mashhad.

Man Without Self--Two Concepts of Alienation, published by Muslim Students Association in the Faculty of Letters, Tehran.

Martyrdom and Its Sequel, two lectures concerning Zaynab given at Husayniya-yi Irshad, Ashura 1351 1972.

The Median School, Mashhad, 1335 1956.

Methodology in the Sciences, lecture at the Commercial High School.

The Pain of Existence, lecture.

The Philosophy of History in the Abrahamic Religions, lecture at Husayniya-yi Irshad.

"The Philosophy of Scientific Determinism in History," lesson 25 of Islamology, Urdibihisht 1351 1972.

A Plan for the Study of Culture, lecture at the Petroleum College, Abadan.

Reasons For the Decline of Religions, lecture at the National University.

Religion Against Religion, lecture at Husayniya-yi Irshad.

Religion and Its Destiny, lessons given at the Faculty of Letters, Mashhad.

The Responsibility of Being Shi'a, lecture at Husayniya-yi Irshad, Aban 1350/1971.

The Revolutionary Role of Remembrance and the Reminders, Husayniya-yi Irshad, Shahrivar 1351/1972.

A Revolution in Values, lecture at the University of Tehran.

Science or the New Scholasticism, lecture at the Faculty of Medicine, Tehran.

The Sociology of Shirk, lecture at the Faculty of Letters, Tehran.

Specimens of Lofty Ethics, translation from the book of Kashif al-Ghita.

Supplication, translation, Mashhad, 1328/1948.

"Tauhid, a Philosophy of History," lesson 21 in the series Islamology, Husayniya-yi Irshad, Farvardin 1351/1972.

"Umma and Imamate," Islamology, Vol. II, 1352/1973.

The Unjust, the Disobedient, the Faithless, Husayniya-yi Irshad, Aban 1351 1972.

Waiting for the Religion of Protest, lecture given at Husayniya-yi Irshad, 1350 1971.

What Shall Be Our Support? essay, Paris, 1961.

World-View, lecture at the Petroleum College, Abadan.

Yes, Thus It Was, O Brother, lecture at Husayniya-yi Irshad.

For Shari'ati, neither the Islam of the scholar nor the Islam of the common people was of value, but only the "Islam of the conscious and aware; he preferred the intellectual and enlightened Muslim to both the scholar and the commoner. In Islam the making of the self and the changing of the self presuppose and accompany each other; it is in this sense that the celebrated sentence--of which Shari'ati was so fond--is to be understood: "Life is conviction and struggle, and nothing more."

This is the vital and urgent message for the conscious Muslim of our age, a message he addressed particularly to the sincere and enlightened youth--"for once youth acquires conviction and faith, it will devote itself fully to them, and be swiftly transformed into an active element in the struggle for the realization of the goals of Islam."

The work of Shari'ati was of undeniable effect in this respect.

His independence of thought and belief was demonstrated above all by his determined defense of truth and justice and the particular attention he paid to religious, social and political events that affected the destiny of the people. In the deathly silence that prevailed everywhere at that time, he could never withdraw from the social struggles and conflicts, and the battle between truth and falsehood. With his speeches and his writings, and other resistance activities, he had caused the authorities to open a file on him. He was never able to remain silent and to accept the negative equilibrium that had been established in society. He fought on two fronts simultaneously. He opposed the extreme traditionalists who had spun a web around themselves, separated Islam from society, retreated into a corner of the mosque and the madrasa, and often reacted negatively to any kind of intellectual movement within society; they had covered the brilliant truths of Islam with a dark veil behind which

They themselves also hid. He also opposed the rootless and imitative intellectuals who had made the "new scholasticism" their stronghold. Both groups had severed their relations with society and the masses of the people, and humbly bowed their heads before the manifestations of corruption and decadence of the modern age.

What is important for us is that he examined history, the philosophy of history, religion and shari'a, and sociology, all within the framework of the general world-view of tauhid, so that tauhid became the intellectual and ideological foundation of both a philosophy of history, uncovering the past fate of man and human society, and a prediction of then future destinies.

All of his philosophical, historical and sociological analyses were joined, then, to a belief in tauhid.

His Works and Ideas

It is not so much the personality and activity of Shari'ati that are important as the works and ideas that he left behind, in the form of recorded lectures, class notes, books and numerous articles, that have been repeatedly printed or duplicated in editions of ten thousand copies or more. They have been sought out by the younger generation with such interest and eagerness that their profound impact can never be effaced from our memories or hearts. All that he said and wrote was expressed with the utmost sincerity, faith and conviction and bore testimony to an extraordinary creative capacity.

CSO: 4600

LIFE'S MISSION OF REVOLUTION MENTOR REVIEWED

Tehran SOROUSH in English No 3, 30 May 81 pp 24-25

[Article by A. Ghaseemy: "Ali' Shariati"]

[Text] He first learned from his father. He grew up with the poor under the shah's regime. Ali becomes an activist. Ali joins the National Iranian Resistance Revolutionary Organization. He suffered torture and imprisonment for eight months in Tehran. After his arrival in France, Ali joined the European branch of the National Iranian Youth Revolutionary Organization. His appointment as editor-in-Chief of the newspaper IRAN-AZAD in Weiss-Baden, W. Germany. His friendship with Franz Fanon, author of "The Damned of the Earth." He finished his doctorate at the Sorbonne, and received six months imprisonment upon his arrival in Iran due to his Islamic activity abroad. The Pahlavi Regime tried to relegate him to obscurity with a small town teaching position. Shariati's speeches on Islamology, Islamic Ideology and the History of Religions at Hosseiniyeh Ershad in Tehran drew an enthusiastic audience. Ali was the thorn in the foot of the lion. A beautiful tulip comes in bloom.

Dr. Ali Shariati was born in December, 1932 in Mazinan, a remote village bordering the desert of Khorassan. His first teacher was his father, Professor Mohammad Taqi Shariati, who is still alive, and was one of the founders of New Islamic Revolution Centre, (Jonbesh Nowin Islami), and has trained hundreds of students and warriors in his schools.

Ali grew up in a very hard conditions in the poor area of Mazinan, living among the oppressed and deprived people, whom he called "MOSTAZ-AFIN", and thus he actually touched and felt the oppression of the corrupt Pahlavi regime. From his childhood, he was surrounded and drawn in by the pains, sorrows, troubles, deprivations and miseries of the deprived and suffering MOSTAZ'AFIN. These experiences influenced deep in his bones and consequently his profound hatred towards oppressors and tyrants, rich and colonizers developed inside him and appeared in almost all of his speeches, lectures and books.

Ali attended the Ibne-Yamin primary school and later, the Ferdowsi secondary school in Mashad. Upon graduation from the high school, he entered the Primary Teacher Training College at Mashad. After a two years course, he was employed as a teacher in the villages around the countryside of Mashad. While he was teaching, he started a university course and five years later he was graduated and achieved B.A. degree in Persian Literature.

While Ali was teaching and studying in Mashad, he married one of his fellow-students, Pouran Shariati Razavi. He has four children — a boy Ehsan and three girls: Sara, Soussan and Sousa.

During the secondary school, through the Centre of Publications of Islamic Facts (which was also founded by his father, Prof. Mohammad Taqi Shariati), Ali joined the New Islamic Revolution centre and became one of the most active members of this Revolutionary Organisation.

It was at this center that he began to publish his scholastic, philosophical and revolutionary articles. Also, it was through this channel that he became acquainted with the thoughts and ideals of the Theological Socialist Revolutionaries and showed a great interest in their ideas. Consequently, in 1958, he published his first scholastic work, entitled "The History of the Evolution of Philosophy".

Furthermore, he was greatly attracted by the personality and life of Abu-Zar Qaffari, the great companion of the Prophet of Islam. In a book about him, which he wrote in 1958, he introduced Abu-Zar as the first God-loving socialist.

During his studies at the Faculty of Literature of the Mashad University, Ali became further acquainted with idea of an Islamic Revolution and actively participated in this ideal.

At this time, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, ruled the country. After the fall of Mossadegh in a military coup d'etat — staged basically by the CIA and the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1953 — Ali joined the National Iranian Resistance Revolutionary Organization which was founded and led by national and liberal personalities such as Ayatollah Taleqani, Dr. Yadollah Sahabi and Eng. Mehdi Bazargan.

In September, 1957, the centers of the National Iranian Resistance Revolutionary Organization were occupied and destroyed in a sudden raid by the agents of the Pahlavi regime throughout the Iran. Practically all of the leaders and active members of the organization were arrested, imprisoned and tortured. Ali Shariati was also arrested along with his father and Tasher Ahmad-Zadeh. At the command of regime, they were all sent from Mashad to Tehran by a military plane.

Ali Shariati was imprisoned and tortured for eight months in Tehran. After his release from prison, he returned to Mashad and while worked as a teacher, continued his studies too.

Ali was born with a unique talent and a high intelligence which enabled him to become the top student among his fellow-students in the Faculty of Literature. The University's board of teachers in support to their current regulations found him eligible for continuing his studies abroad and awarded him with a scholarship. However, from the view point of the

Shah's Security Police Organization (SAVAK). Ali's dark record was the main reason for refusing to giving him permission to leave the country. Eventually they were compelled to release his passport and Ali left Tehran for France in 1960.

Upon his arrival in France, Ali joined the European branch of the National Iranian Youth Revolutionary Organization and began writing political and revolutionary articles. Later, in February 1962, he established the National Iranian Front of America with the aid of his friends and the National Iranian Front of Europe in May of the same year.

After the first meeting of congress of the European branch in August, 1962, which was held in Weise-Baden, W. Germany, Ali Shariati was appointed editor-in-chief of the Organisation's newspaper and published the first edition of the monthly publication of Iran-Azad (Free-Iran) on 19th November, 1962.

At the same time, he was closely cooperating with the Algerian Liberation Front and the Al-Mejahed Organization. He placed both his talents and pen at the service of the Algerian people and helped them in their fight for liberation. It was through these means that he became acquainted with the leading thinkers and writers like Frantz Fanon, Howary Bomidienne and Ben Bella.

His close friendship with Frantz Fanon persuaded him to translate one of the Fanon's work entitled "The damned of the Earth" (Les Damnes de la Terre) into Persian in 1966.

Ali also became acquainted with many other leading writers and philosophers during his stay in France. Among them were Goerwitch, Louis Massignon (both were his professors at the University of Sorbonne), Schwartz, Sartre, Henri Loumoure and Jean Cocteau. All these men helped Ali in his deep study of Western philosophy and sociology. He was particularly interested in the works of Goerwitch, the famous French sociologist, and was brilliant among his fellow-students to know Goerwitch the best.

After completing his studies and taking his Doctorate Degree in Sociology and Islamic History for the University of Sorbonne, he returned to Iran. However, due to his outspoken criticisms and activities against the oppressive Pahlavi Regime, he was arrested at the Iranian border and imprisoned for six months.

Severe protests began after his arrest. Especially, his professors in France and his friends in the International Revolutionary Organization condemned the action and the then Hoveyda's government of the Shah was forced to release him from the prison. Even though he held doctorate degree from the University of Sorbonne, he was sent to teach in a high school in Ferdowse, a small town near Mashad. But the regime eventually retreated and invited him to serve as professor in the University of Mashad.

From this time, Ali began announcing genuine Islamic concepts and ideals. Once his works were heard, the students and the younger generation, who were determined to know the true facts of Islamic ideology, flocked to hear his speeches and lectures. His teachings spread rapidly throughout the whole

Iran and he received many invitations from the universities in other cities for giving lectures. He eagerly accepted these invitations and travelled a great deal and particularly held his lectures in the universities to expound his teachings for the educated and intellectuals.

In 1970, Dr. Shariati's popular, revolutionary lectures and speeches on Islamology, Islamic Ideology and the History of Religions began in the Hosseiniyeh Ershad in Tehran and continued until 1973. His speeches attracted the great interest of not only the university students and intellectuals, but also the ordinary Iranians. During this rather short period he gave more than two hundred lectures and speeches in the Hosseiniyeh Ershad and while enlightening the various classes of the people in the community, prepared the way for revolution, the armed struggle and the fight against the Pahlavi regime. This struggle finally to the overthrow of regime and the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

The Shah's regime which could not tolerate the existence of Dr. Shariati's lectures at the Hosseiniyeh Ershad, closed it in 1973 and tried to arrest Dr. Shariati. He went into hiding. SAVAK imprisoned his father in order to force Dr. Shariati to give up himself. Naturally Ali had to give up himself to SAVAK and he did so. Thus he was imprisoned and tortured for a further eighteen months. While under torture, SAVAK tried to force him to announce his support for the Shah's regime, to which Ali replied: "If they torture my body with the dripping candle wax, as they did with Ayn-ol-Qozaat, I will not even murmur a sound".

Meanwhile, the activities and protests of his friends abroad and both Iranian and non-Iranian students in Europe and America, as well as the pressure from the International Politicians drew the attention to his case. When the ex-Shah travelled to Algeria — to try to solve the Kurdish problem with Iraq along with the help of the Algerian Liberation Organization — Bomidienne, who was the President of Algeria and who knew Shariati and was aware of his imprisonment, advised the Shah to release Ali upon his return from Algeria. And so he was released. But after his release, he was under constant surveillance and harassement of SAVAK and of course, he was not permitted to give any lecture or publish any of his works. Finally with help of his friends Dr. Shariati planned to leave Iran as a refugee in April 1976 and settle in Europe.

He was pursued by SAVAK agents and consequently was murdered mysteriously in May 1976, in London. His body was taken to Damascus and was buried in Zaynabiyeh, beside the tomb of the Great Zaynab — the sister of Imam Hossein — and whom Dr. Shariati greatly loved and admired.

The Blessings and Greetings of the God be upon him, and indeed, upon all martyrs of the world, beginning from Abel, up to the end of time.

CSO: 4600

RECONSTRUCTION CRUSADE GIVES TWO-YEAR PROGRESS REPORT

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 21 Jun 81 p 8

[Text]

To take part in construction altogether to make habitable all the ruins!

A member of the Central Council of the Construction Jihad said "The shortage and delay in payment of the budget has brought down the capability of the revolutionary organ".

The backs together will be formed into a strong dam. The cranks together get power and legs are stayed straight under the reign of this stanzas.

While a hand ties to another hand and pulls forward to offer help, while a step takes up following another step in the path of construction. While the hearts and minds sympathize with the oppressed and suffering and endeavor to stay strong for removing the rust. That is the time when the deep wound of pains is cured and the life gets color in the bed of hope and construction.

There is a ruined Iran where the people still have the blister and scourge of pain and poverty on their backs. The cities are still being confronted with difficulties. The mostaz'af masses have not yet rested from the monarchies cruelties. But there is no fear for a pillar of construction has been founded hereby in ruined Iran.

And thousands of the lovers of the people and God have stepped up in the path of construction for a habitable and Islamic Iran. The youth who have in one hand a pen and news and a sickle and pick in the other, the youths who have left the cities and have gone to villages, in order to bury the poverty in the depth of endeavour and trials. They share the pains and suffering of villagers. We are talking about Construction Jihad and their sacrifices and endeavours.

The revolution gained the victory amidst fire and blood two years ago as the people helped one another with their heart and soul. Everyone did whatever he could. There was no limitation for love and sacrifice of the people.

The people were determined to overcome all the difficulties for that, Imam Khomeini the Leader

of the Revolution addressed the people on June, 1980 and shouted, "I extend our hands toward the nation for the second stage which is the stage of construction and I want all our nation from all walks of life to take part in the movement and start this Construction Jihad. ....Dear students, specialists, bazaaris, peasants and all the other volunteer sectors of the nation make habitable the ruined Iran which has been inherited by us. Therefore we call the movement a Construction Jihad".

Imam called everyone for the Jihad that is Jihad against oppressors and for the oppressed.

Thousands men and women, old and young set out for villages with whatever they had and they did what they could. They built schools and clinics, reaped the wheat and tried to bring dow the heavy load of shortages from the shoulder of villagers. After Imam's message, the Deputy of the the premier announced the formation of the central bureau of Construction Jihad and is ready to hear your views and proposals in order to lay down the Imam's order as best as possible. Following the statement, groups, assemblies, organizations and various strata of people announced their readiness to participate in Construction Jihad in rural regions. The then provisional government promised it would spend 60 billion rials for the villagers.

Now, the second anniversary of the establishment of Construction Jihad, there is no village throughout the country that has not been singled at for improvement and reconstruction by the members of the Construction Jihad. This revolutionary organ has no aim but helping the oppressed masses, although, ever since its formation, plots and obstructions have been launched against it by counter-revolutionaries. After two months of its birth one of the engineers of the organ in Sistan and Baluchestan was martyred. But all the conspiracies of it's opponents do not work and beloved members of Jihad keep going along the path they have chosen.

Construction Jihad has concentrated all activities in five areas: cultural, improvement, agricultural, medical and industrial. But as the time goes on, the area of its activities will become more extensive. This organ commences its task in the villages and inaccessible areas. It works on building clinics, mosques, schools, mortuaries and hygienic lavatories.

In its 19th month report card which was published on the occasion of the anniversary of Revolution indicate that in the improvement department more than thousand public baths, 370 mosques, 1790 hygienic lavatories and 1,695 houses have been built for the oppressed villagers. Definitely these figures are increasing.

In the agricultural department, the following works have been done: thousands of parcels of uncultivated land were brought into cultivation, the transfer of thousands agricultural machines, tractors, combine and whatsoever that revive the dead body of rural agriculture.

The medical team also has dispatched thousand of groups and has treated the patients and the contribution of free drugs is another activity of the Construction Jihad.

The cultural section has also founded exhibitions, printing and contribution of posters and the formation of thousands of libraries. They supply piped drinking water, building high roads, construction of bridges, dams, flood prevention, to supply electricity, digging of deep wells and dredging of canals, spraying agricultural poison, the vaccination of animals ad the formation of rural Islamic council are the other works of the construction Jihad.

The Aim of the Construction Jihad

«One of the members of the Central Construction Jihad says about the aim of the formation of this organ: "The duty of Jihad is to transmit the culture of revolution inside the villages. The organ has had successes relatively.

Abbas Akhondi, another member of the organ says that: "Jihad has passed two stages, one the formation of the organ and the other, was the improvement of organization at the time of provisional government, the organ was an exile center for government staff even unpious persons. But after the new government took power, Jihad could follow the line of Imam and in less than a year it has been able to create organizations in all fields.

The Central Council of Jihad endeavoured to find out the roots of to problems and existing difficulties in order to increase the quality of the revolutionary organ.

For this purpose, Jihad has held few seminars especially the one which was held on December, 1980. Jihad's policy was formed on the basis of the four principles of Velayat-e Faghih and the Leadership of Imam Khomeini, the mobilization of all faithful forces using all the services and the actual and potential forces in the frame of the divine laws. The priority of work is for oppressed people.

Jihad undertook another important role in the imposed war on Iran by Ba'athist regime by formation of a supporting staff for the war fronts.

Eversince the organ has dispatched the needs of the fronts and the war-stricken behind the fronts. The other branches of the organ in the war fronts are involved actively in helping the injured, building roads, building trenches and mending of machines and war facilities.

The Organ's Problems

The member of the Central Council of Jihad in describing the Jihad's problems pinpointed economic sanctions and the war conditions and said: "One of the problems is the shortage of the possibilities and expert forces that stem from the war conditions and economic sanction. Another problem is budget. Last year's budget was 15 billion tomans which is less than our projection. But we asked 12 billion, rials for this year and about 8 billions of that was approved.

Akhondi indicated they will make official the local Islamic councils and the formation of cooperatives as future plans of the organ, develop concerning the councils he said: "This should be down through the Consultative Assembly".

Another member of Jihad called on people to help the oppressed and share in their difficulties. And this year, the same as last year help the war-stricksmed. Only the aid of the people can solve these problems. He also asked people with all their power to help in reaping, and giving agricultural machineries for self-sufficiency of the country.

Part of the Jihad Activities Behind the Fronts and Dispatched Aid to War Fronts up to the Year 1980

Heavy vehicles 832 sets
Light vehicles 1,066 sets
Mending the Heavy machines 8,745 times
Mending the light machines 11,836 times
Spare parts 98,759 pieces
Drugs 1238144 descriptions
Food materials 50,250 tons

Cash money 600242309
Clothes, life equipments 60024238 rials
Dispached personnels 3230 persons
The war-stricke n under the support 200,000 persons in Khoreen and Ilam provinces

The formation of camp in Ramhormoz and Omidieh two times
Temporary bath 3 times
Completion of hospital nd outpost 3 times
Building of ammunition coalers two times
Temporary shelter 200 times
Building roads 3,497 km
Constructing canal 34 km.

Maintenance and mending of roads 30 km
Building trenches 2629 times
Anti-bomb shelter 59 times
The rent of helicopter 6 times
Building of runaways 4 times.

Part Two-Year Activities of Jilin

	Completed	Uncompleted	Mended
To supply water in villages	2,134 times	792	704
To supply electricity	899 times	249	154
Building bath	1,469	804	1,888
School	1,992	1,357	4,887
Mortuary	367	135	187
Building house	1,934	377	2,690
Free treatment	13,692,080		
Dental surgery	124,290		
Injection and bandage	1,173,429		
Vaccination	891,825		
Dispatched medical teams	8,328 villages		
Dispatched patients to hospitals	81,554		

CSO: 4600

BRIEFS

AYATOLLAH'S SON DEFROCKED--Mashhad--PARS NEWS AGENCY--At the end of the crowded public procession by the people of Mashhad which took place in this city on Sunday night following the announcement of the vote at the Majlis, Mahmud Qomi, son of Ayatollah Qomi, was defrocked by the people at the Goharshad Mosque. According to the PARS NEWS AGENCY, the participants in this procession, which was headed by one of the militant clerics of Mashhad, Hojjatol-Eslam Safa'i, after crossing a few streets, gathered in the entrance hall of the mosque and began to shout the slogan "death to the anti-clerical authority." As a result, Ayatollah Qomi could not leave the place for one hour after the religious ceremony had ended. According to this report, the people encircled Mahmud Qomi, who had already been defrocked by Ayatollah Khalkhali once before, and defrocked him again by removing his cloak and turban. [Text] [Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Jun 81 p 4]

CSO: 4640/27

GOLAN HEIGHTS ANNEXATION PROPOSAL VIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 May 81 pp 11, 12

[Article by Yoram Hamizrahi: "The Golan in the Shadow of the Threat"]

[Text] "If Israel does not annex the Golan Heights now, precisely because of security and the political warmup in the region, it will be bad; enemies of the state will raise their heads even more," Mr Makhsin abu-Salah, chairman of the Mis'ada Local Council, said to me. The man who served 2 1/2 years in the Syrian Army ("I was a clerk in the recruitment office in Latakiya") today carries in his pocket an Israeli identity card since in these insane days of practically a gathering of the storm, he can find fewer people who openly share his political perceptions and opinions and he can recount the idiosyncracy and nervousness of the public opposing Israel and, in particular, among youth who are increasingly assembling and discussing the new situation.

The Druzes in the Golan Heights well remember the Yom Kippur War which descended on them like a bolt out of the blue, "when they suddenly saw the Syrian troops and tanks and understood that nothing is secure," a local cab driver, who joined the calm dialogue said to me as he leaned on the fender of his red Mercedes, adding that "since then they have understood that the Syrians can return and so they are not as secure; now there are those who are afraid and others who hope that this is the true situation!" Mr abu-Salah, of medium height, curly-haired, mustachioed, can tell of threatening letters which he received recently and also about the raising of the Syrian white, red and black flag over the schoolhouse of the neighboring village of Majdal Shemes.

The road which winds between Mis'ada and Majdal Shemes passes over greening apple orchards. Farmers in white head coverings and youth in parkas, or reticent women walking along in small groups seem to be dodging among the trees. A few are actually working beside the separation fence opposite the narrow blacktop road leading to Syria. The view includes a tin hut which once a week serves as a site for family meetings, an outpost which has been whitewashed and beside which stands a soldier in a blue helmet, and a bit further a concrete structure above which there is the flag of Syria, and an even taller Syrian observation post and bunker. The post and the flag are also visible from the settlements of Majdal Shemes as a constant reminder to the 15,000 Druzes of the Golan, while within the fence there is the UN and the political reality--a divided and confused world, silent and cautious people torn between two loyalties. Above a few of the village houses flies a blue-white flag, and in the sky one sees a flight of slow, lazy storks. Still higher, one can see a

pair of the long, thickening ensrails of fighter planes, and on the sides of the Hermon, isolated and last spots of frost or snow, clusters of clouds and the faraway and mysterious forest of antennas.

At the bend in the road, a monument commemorating several of the fallen of the Golan Brigade, a palm of a hand hewn in stone carrying at each finger joint a name of the fallen. Memorial Day is still close. At the side of the monument, a soot-covered helmet and flag of an orphan. On the road, a military vehicle loaded with young soldiers singing with parched throats. It's cold in the Golan, and the soldiers are clad in parkas or gray, cold-weather coveralls. On the main road, one can at times see, also, UN and diplomatic vehicles whose passengers sit tensely with their eyes darting in all directions, and many foreign television crews, cameras curious and at the ready. Somewhere at the side of the road tanks are rolling, there are brown dense clouds of smoke, the noise of pounding axles and the clatter of chains. The delicate antennas quiver and shake. The young boys in the turrets appear large and confident beneath their heavy helmets; a young officer leaps forth from his fast-moving jeep, "No pictures! This isn't a circus." While the man seeks to identify the photographers on the road, actually among the heavy and thundering tanks, a busload of tourists goes by and after that another bus loaded with children. A tour guide leans down from the window and pours forth explanations in a stream. The officer capitulates; "If the tourists are taking pictures, who am I to chase you away? In any case, I've noted the names. The censor will deal with the matter."

A large, modern tractor goes by in the adjacent field and someone is inspecting the irrigation system and the sprinklers. Here, too, one sees large flights of storks and pelicans. The noise of the armor rolling in routine security maneuver drives away the birds, who disappear beyond the horizon.

Now one can see Kuneitra, a phantom city were here and there thrust toward the skys from among the ruins, are towers of mosques or a church, gray and damaged as the bones of a corpse, in addition mounds of earth, black stone barriers, and everywhere flags of the UN are seen. Near the apple orchards of the Ayn-Ziwan kibbutz we met Herbert Kuschnitz, a corporal from Vienna, lean, pale-faced, bespectacled and appearing somewhat ludicrous beneath his blue helmet, with a modern Austrian storm-rifle in his hands; "It won't do me any good if everything bursts into flames." A UN flag waves in the light breeze and the protruding communications instrument spews forth words in German. Opposite and beyond the fence the Syrian barrier is visible. A few of the soldiers are engaged in digging a pit and in cleanup chores, and on the road a heavy military lorry, loaded with earth, is parked. From time to time a group of Syrian hikers or press people approach the barrier to look out toward our side.

From afar the sounds of dull artillery fire reach us. "Practice," someone decides. These days it is unpleasant to hear the sound of firing and even the farmers in the field listen attentively. At the entrance to Katzrin an armored troop vehicle is parked, and on its deck children are playing with the soldiers who happened upon the place. The city still displays the Independence Day decorations on its clean streets with many privately owned vehicles, also visible are young vegetable patches and tender, low trees. "Just so a confrontation doesn't come," a lady who was angry at the sight of the camera crews and correspondents said to us. "These are like ravens gathering for a meal!" At the offices of the local council there is business as usual. Mr Sami Bar-Lev, head of the council strokes his beard, his narrow features bronzed; "Concerned but not afraid," he says. In the adjacent building the heads of the

regional council and the activists of the Committee of Golan Settlements are sitting. Mr Shimon Shabees of Afik Kibbutz, bearded and energetic, again notes the importance of the Golan Heights. "We are concerned about the situation in Lebanon, but also we remember well the War of Attrition. Up to 1974 we were still living in shelters. We are confident in ourselves and have confidence in the IDF but despite this we are concerned."

On the Golan Heights one does not dare call a child by name. Those aware of what is happening listen to the news and also interpret it on an individual basis, but speak circuitously. There is "worry, fear, suspicion." The word war is almost never mentioned and when needed they prefer to use less threatening words such as "confrontation or escalation," anything, just not war, not even a war of attrition. A week after Memorial Day they remember well the other possibility. At the sides of the Golan Road there are many small or large monuments, names, hundreds of names, and here and there even iron skeletons.

As the lead for the April issue of EREIZ HAGOLAN, the organ of the Committee of Golan Settlements, one member wrote an article with the headline "Fear and Overflowing" and the member says the following, among other things:

"The order to fire from Damascus was given to the big guns in Lebanon and not to the big guns on the Golan Heights, not because the Syrians love us more than they love the Lebanese, it's simply that we're stronger, that we're sitting higher up and we can threaten Damascus."

The radio spews forth up-to-the-minute information, accurate details of the travels of Phillip Habib, the firing on the port of Juniah, quotations from the various and weird radio stations, identified or unidentified spokesmen of Mr Begin or his opponent Mr Peres. "How old are you?" someone asks one of the young armored corps personnel who comes down from his tank turret. "Nineteen years old," comes the answer. "So, you were 11 when I did battle here from these very heights in 1973, come let us pray that you will be privileged to be demobilized without a similar experience."

It's cool at the Golan. Flocks of sheep or cattle graze. Donkeys loaded with firewood pass. Tractors plowing beside observation posts and tourists riding air-conditioned buses cross this strange region, pass between a wild and enchanting landscape with tools of destruction and the sounds of alertness. Spring is nearing a close and someone reminds me that once, not many years ago, we used to talk about an "electric summer."

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SYRIAN MILITARY THREAT ASSESSED

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 11 May 81 p 11

[Article by Eliezer Strouch: "'The Fragmentation of the Syrian Army in Lebanon Will Weaken Its Deployment in the Golan'"]

[Text] The Syrian Army, with which the IDF will have to contend--if the efforts to prevent a conflagration in the northern region fail--is no longer, in several aspects, the same army that we recognized during the Yom Kippur War. This is an army which, with the support of the Soviet Union has rehabilitated itself, has strengthened its fire power, and has absorbed a great quantity of high quality war materiel.

But parallel with the process of strengthening itself, situation changes have occurred during the past 8 years which do not favor Damascus, all of this raises the question: What are the military options available to the Syrians, if they decide to react to every action that the IDF undertakes against the positioning of the SAM missiles in Lebanon?

Power and Authority

This question grants a dimension of currency to a study which had been undertaken by Brig Gen (Res.) Yehoshu'a Raviv for the Center of Strategic Studies of the University of Tel Aviv on the topic "Balance of the Arab-Israeli Forces After the Peace Treaty With Egypt." The study was previously publicized in July of 1979, but a repeat look at its content--in its sections related to Syria--reveals that its conclusions are valid today as well, for the most part. On the basis of the assumptions in that study, guidelines can be established for finding answers to several questions which now arise.

In relation to the strategic outlook, Brigadier General Raviv establishes that Syria is integrating the significant military power which it has acquired in recent years, with a domination over an area from which it can exert this power directly against Israel. This situation gains validity because of the recent developments in Lebanon. However, the investigator adds, in its present strategic situation Syria by itself does not have the strength to subdue Israel.

Two years ago, Iraq and Jordan still appeared to be natural partners of Syria in any military undertaking against Israel. But in light of the sharp rivalry which has since developed between them and the regime in Damascus, there are reduced prospects for the creation of such an alliance during the current crisis.

There are, however, those who believe that precisely because of the isolation into which Syria has been thrust--among other things, because of its rivalry with Iraq and Jordan--it sees in a war with Israel a means of restoring to itself a position of honor in the Arab world, and even a method of compelling the rulers of Baghdad and Amman to participate with it on the battlefield, despite the differences of opinion among them.

In any event, the author of the study believes, a Syrian-Iraqi alliance, or unity between Syria and Iraq, are not a precondition for the existence of a military option against Israel. For even lower levels of military coordination and cooperation between the two would suffice for this purpose.

Among other things, Raviv notes the balance of advantages and limitations of Syrian intervention in Lebanon.

Advantages and Limitations

On the side of advantages he counts: A Syrian presence in the Lebanese sector can assure against an Israeli flank attack toward Damascus. It permits military activity on various levels against Israel, including a strike at important population concentrations in the finger of the Galilee and in the settlements along the northern road.

In contrast to this, the Syrian presence in Lebanon has important limitations, in the opinion of Yeshoshu'a Raviv, principally the fragmentation of the Syrian Army causing a weakness in the Golan sector and forcing employment of troops in "police activities" which do not contribute to high morale among them.

Relying on all this, the investigator casts doubts on whether it would be to the advantage of Syria to convert Lebanon to an active sector. However, if additional forces are integrated within the battle framework, a conflagration in the Lebanese sector would serve Syrian goals in that it might bring about a fragmentation of the Israeli effort and a weakening of the Israeli pressure on the Golan Heights sector.

The Reasonable Possibility

According to Raviv, the ratio of forces in the Golan Heights which is to the disadvantage of Israel from the aspect of the range of regular forces usually deployed in this sector, the Syrians have a great temptation to launch a surprise attack, because of a tendency to conquer as large an area as possible within that sector. But this, on condition that they estimate they would be able to surprise the IDF and would be convinced that a supporting power (Iraq, according to the scenario of Raviv; Soviet, according to a possibility which has been raised recently) would arrive on time, before the IDF were to mobilize a great part of its reserve formations.

From the conditions imposed by the investigator, it appears that in today's situation the more logical possibility available to the Syrians is to start a war of attrition which would take the form of the application of fire power on forces and settlements over the length of the border, together with the utilization of ground-to-ground missiles which are in the arsenal of the Arab armies. Within the framework of these activities, the Syrians would be able to attempt to dominate positions or to conquer settlements, with the intention of attaining a prestigeous gain and at the same time to compel Israel to respond in an uncomfortable manner, since, lack of response would compel Israel to submit to events and to lose its credibility.

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SLIGHT INCREASE SEEN IN ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF CAMP DAVID

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 10 May 81 p 8

[Article by Yehoshua Tadmur: "Flickers of Submission to the Camp David Agreement"]

[Text] It is difficult to feel excessive optimism about the future relations of Israel with the Arab world. The dominant trend since the Baghdad summit of about 2 1/2 years ago continues to be firm and on occasion even a stiffening can be perceived. The Arab pressure continues along the entire front. Saudi Arabia is advancing the campaign in favor of the PLO while exploiting its economic clout to buy off governments and powers, including those which from a historical perspective should have remained moderate for many more years. Thus, the Arab trend is stiffening.

The Syrian-Israeli confrontation has obscured the picture even more. But one should differentiate between what Arab spokesmen say in public, and what they say for Syrian ears. For example, Saudi Arabia denounced Israel for its intervention, but in a quiet diplomatic dialogue a high-ranking Saudi emissary let harsh words come out about Syrian pugnacity. It's not that the Saudis are all that enamored with the Christians. But they are not overjoyed by the Syrian attack on a civilian population or by Syrian domination of a neighboring state. Riyadh does not wish this to become the norm, particularly with Saudi financing. Most states of the Persian Gulf take a similar stand. Thus: There exists a negative relationship of the Arab states toward Israel because of its intervention in Lebanon. There exists generally, public Arab support for Syria; and there exist the true stands of the Arab states, which are transmitted to the rulers of Syria.

Without the Syrian-Israeli confrontation in Lebanon it would be easier for us to estimate initial indications of submission by various Arab factors to the Camp David agreement with Egypt, and here and there on the civilian professional level with Israel as well. We have recently been apprised that Sudan is once again sending its ambassador to Cairo and that the diplomatic relations between the two countries are returning to normal. This is great news for Egypt which had been totally isolated following the Camp David agreement and even Sudan, its neighbor and ally, had abandoned it. Now, Nimeiri is about to make an official and ceremonial visit to Cairo after which As Sadat will carry out a reciprocal visit to Khartoum on the day of the revolution in conformity with all the rules of protocol.

Here, finally, is a first Arab country about to break the excommunication of Egypt because of Camp David without its being deterred by Pan-Arab pressure. In the Egyptian press there are tales of an additional unnamed Arab state which is testing steps on the matter. We shall wait and see.

Relative to this issue, the remarks of Prof Itamar Rabinowitz, chairman of the Shiloah Institute, who was referring to an interesting phenomenon, are encouraging. In the past, in any international commission or assemblage, the scientists, members of the free professions, and the members of the spiritual people, would take pains to stand up and stalk out of the auditorium as a protest excommunication of Israel. Today, matters are different, said Professor Rabinowitz. Today, in almost every commission, Israelis are meeting with Arabs--not only with Egypt--and an impression is being created of mutual curiosity to listen and to speak. The conclusion is, that the agreement with Egypt has in great measures wiped out the tabu on such contacts. Nor is this a small matter when we remember how we ferreted out, 2 1/2 years ago, any Arab representative or visitor on any commission in any nook of the globe and reported thereon hurriedly to Jerusalem.

Of course it is preferable not to overestimate. We are still talking about relatively small flickers of submission, which are not likely to develop and stand the test. But, in almost every Arab capital--with the exception of the "standfast" states--attempts at soul searching are revealing themselves here and there.

Thus, in Baghdad, at the summit of the regime, questions are being asked about the future of the struggle against the Camp David agreement, in the wake of the weakening of the joint Arab framework. There, they are reflecting upon what will become of the struggle against Egypt, which, if not intensified, will expire with the passage of time. Overt evidence of the start of a revision in the attitude toward Egypt and toward the Camp David agreement was given in a lead article in SAB'UA AL-ARABI, a respected daily of Kuwait. Particularly because we are referring to extremist Kuwait, do the comments have significance. The article raised many echoes despite the partial obfuscation and the code language of its author, not in Kuwait alone but in most of the Persian Gulf states. This is the first article of its kind, signed by editor Assad Abd al-Aziz Alsuaralla, who is connected with the family of the rulers. Inasmuch as Kuwait belongs, much more than in a pro forma manner to the Baghdad Front, and on several occasions served as the Arabic point of the spear in the campaign against Israel--the comments deserve special attention.

A digest of the article: A general call to the Arabs to reassess their relationship to the Camp David agreements, to the Egyptian policy, and to Egypt. The editor explains why the Arabs should reassess their stand. He himself argues that the demand upon Egypt to change the Camp David agreements is absurd because the breach in international credibility would damage Egypt as well as the entire Arab world. The author of the article even poses several questions of realpolitik, such as: Who profited from the agreement, Egypt or Israel? The answer to that one, may make it possible, he says, to summarize the outcome. He raises other questions, some open and some dovetailed into the obscure and coded style of the article.

Why so much obfuscation? Because it is clear that the issue is a controversial matter in Arab public opinion, and the writer is not willing to endanger himself unduly. The editor Assad Abd al-Aziz is prominent in the Arab world and in the Persian Gulf. He is not a revolutionary, nor is his newspaper of that ilk. Reason would therefore indicate that if he wrote what he did, he certainly acquired the support and the encouragement of one of the princes of a number of the higher-ups in the summit of the regime. This is the reason for the significance of the article, which implies that there should be a submission to the Camp David agreements, to Egypt and, indirectly,

to Israel as well. Not automatic. Not before an attempt to squeeze out of it the maximum, according to the conditions of the Arabs. But the writer of the article believes that Egypt profited from Camp David more than it lost in comparison to Israel. The author notes that in the Camp David agreement there is a specific reference to the Palestinians and there are gains in the agreement. The article mentions Bourguiba and his method, as a covert comparison to As-Sadat. At one time the Arabs referred to Bourguiba with derision and contempt and now matters have changed. Bourguiba has become a symbol and the implication of these comments is that history will treat As-Sadat similarly.

These are not pleasant references to the Israeli ear, but these are the comments. Egypt has held to them from the time of As-Sadat's visit to this very day and it is not beyond possibility that the writer discussed the matter with one of Egypt's leaders, perhaps even with As-Sadat himself.

If Egypt's stubborn stands become the inheritance of the "central" block of Arab states, and they become prepared to negotiate with Israel, that will be a great day. But the negotiation itself will be difficult and almost hopeless. Nevertheless, the flickers of the turnaround should be observed, although the road is still very long.

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BRIEFS

ARAB ACADEMICS SUPPORT PERES--Arab academics who have organized within the framework of an organization ELEPH (acronym for Citizens for Peres) Jalal abu-Tu'ama (former head of the local council in Ak Hal Garbiya), Dr Ahmad 'Atamana (a physician in the Beilinson Hospital) and Jadan Biyadasi (graduate of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem) announced at a press conference yesterday at Sokolov House in Tel Aviv that they have decided to join the election campaign of the Alignment since it feels an obligation to the Arab sector. The three maintained that the Likud government totally disregarded the Arab sector and did not sanction any activity or project in it, something which has increased the alienation between the Arab and Jewish population. In the Arab sector there are 230,000 individuals with voting rights, that is a force which can bring 12 representatives to the Knesset. The three noted that the function of the Arabs joining the ELEPH organization is to be active among Arab youth and intellectual women and Arab academics, in order "to open the eyes of the Arab voters so that they will not be misled." They added: "The Alignment should be strengthened because its policy is to bring the two nations closer together and to broaden the peace process. There is no contradiction between the nationalistic sentiments among the Arab intellectuals and their support of the Alignment, which is ready for discussion with any Arab element that recognizes the right of the state of Israel to exist in security and in peace with its neighbors." The three said that the question, who will be an Arab candidate for the Knesset, and on which place on the Alignment list would he be placed, is a very important question, but the question facing the Arab sector today is: Who will make up the next government and who will determine the face of the state for the next 4 years?

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U. S. INVESTMENTS CITED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 25, 22 Jun 81 p 2

[Text]

The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, the state-owned oil concern, has set up a $100 million joint venture to explore for energy and minerals in the US with the American agri-business company AZL Resources. The venture, the second such deal by KPC since a similar one in May with Pacific Resources (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, May 4) has renewed fears of an Arab take-over of American business.

The two joint ventures, although they are worth no more $300 million, are fuelling Congressional opposition to further investment in the US by members of OPEC. According to a report recently "leaked" to the American press, Kuwait has amassed almost $7 billion worth of equities in a wide range of companies in the US. Another report from the Securities Industry Association (SIA), states that seven oil-rich countries – Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – increased their US holdings by $5.3 billion last year, compared to $3.4 billion in 1979.

Although these sums are considerable, they have to be seen in the perspective of other foreign investments in the US. British investors increased their equity holdings by $12.5 billion in 1980 from $6.9 billion in 1979. And a recent Commerce Department report on 1979 levels of activity by foreigners in the US leads to the conclusion that fears of Arab buying up of the US are not justified (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, March 9).

These fears are further belied by the latest issue of the Morgan Guaranty Trust's review which estimates that Arab surplus funds are being increasingly channelled to the Third World. According to the review, Arab institutions led or co-led nearly one-third of all publicised Euroloans to non-oil developing countries in the first four months of this year, accounting for some 12 per cent of total international lending to these countries. A suggestion of this could already be glimpsed in the latest quarterly review of the Bank for International Settlements. In that review (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, May 25), BIS pointed out that non-oil developing states' borrowing had greatly surged in the last quarter of 1980 and that OPEC was a large indirect supplier of funds to the international banking system, which lends to the Third World countries. As much as $13.5 billion may have been channelled from OPEC into the banking network in the last three months of 1980.

CSO: 4300/24

BRIEFS

INDUSTRIAL BANK LOANS--The Industrial Bank of Kuwait provided 41 loans totalling $117.4 million last year, according to an OPECNA report last week. The comparative figure for 1979 was $69.73 million, the OPEC News Agency added. The funds disbursed by the Industrial Bank last year were divided between direct loans, worth $110.1 million, and capital participation in projects which came to $7.34 million. Since its inception in 1973, the Industrial Bank of Kuwait, which is partly government owned, has contributed to the financing of 181 projects through credits of $513.8 million, OPECNA said. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 25, 22 Jun 81 p 2]

CSO: 4300/25

GOVERNMENT MINISTER ANNOUNCES FOOD PRICING POLICY

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 19 May 81 p 6

[Article: "Junblat Presents State's Food Policy; Price of Kilogram of Breat Set at 150 Piasters; Letter to Council of Ministers Demanding That Canadian Wheat Agreement Be Abolished"]

[Text] Khalid Junblat, the minister of economy and commerce, has announced that the Council of Ministers has decided to raise the price of the top-quality white flour [zero] delivered to bakeries to 70 piasters per Kg and that it has set the price of a Kg of bread, delivered to the bakery, at 150 piasters per Kg.

Junblat has asserted that the Kg will consist of 6 loaves and will be uniform in all parts of Lebanon, pointing out that this measure will save the state 150 million [Lebanese] pounds annually, of which 118 million will result from the difference in the price of the top-quality white flour which has been sold at 40 piasters per Kg and has now been raised to 70 piasters per Kg and 32 million will result from the difference in the price of the local flour which has now been set at 100 piasters per Kg.

Junblat has also discussed the food security policy which the state is seeking to implement by encouraging the production of local wheat. This production which annually has been yielding 60,000 tons purchased by the state at incentive prices. The minister also spoke of the silos which the ministry plans to build in cooperation with the FAO to guarantee decentralized storage and flour mills.

Junblat has said that Lebanon consumes 360,000 tons of wheat annually which saddles the state with nearly 308 million Lebanese pounds [in subsidies].

Junblat has also referred to the Canadian wheat issue and has reviewed the phases of the disagreement and of the contacts which have taken place between the ministry, the Canadian Wheat Council and Agro Company.

He said that he has drafted a letter to the Council of Ministers demanding that the agreement concluded with the Canadian Wheat Council, that stipulated that Lebanon be supplied with one million tons of Canadian wheat over a period of 5 years and at an annual volume of no less than 150,000 tons, be abolished.

The minister of economy and commerce has asserted that the disagreement with the Agro Company developed when he asked the company to reduce the shipping fare rate set for shipping 150,000 tons in 1981 and the company refused the demand, insisting that the

shipping rate be $39.80 per ton as a minimum. This led to seeking other price bids and it has become evident that the shipping rates are $36.80 per ton.

Junblat yesterday morning held a press conference at his office in the ministry where he discussed the ministry's food policy, the pricing of wheat, flour and bread, the issue of the Canadian wheat agreement and the ministry's accomplishments in protecting consumers.

Food Policy and Prices

Regarding the food policy, Junblat said that it is the duty of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce--the Grains and Sugarbeet Bureau--to establish the food situation on the basis of guaranteeing food safety and quality so that the ministry may be able, consequently, to secure bread to the consumer at a fixed, well-studied and stable price. Realizing this task has saddled the treasury with a burden of 55 million pounds in 1978, of 86 million pounds in 1979 and of 158 million pounds in 1980 as a result of the rising cost of purchasing, grinding and shipping wheat.

If we consider the quantity expected to be consumed in 1981, a quantity amounting to 360,000 tons, the total would amount to 450,000 tons and the burden to be shouldered by the treasury would be fearful, amounting to more than 308 million Lebanese pounds [sentence as published].

In response to the reality under which we live, out of our belief that the subsidy is not realizing the goal for which it was established and that it goes to classes that least need and least deserve this subsidy. While taking into consideration the interests of the employees, workers, farmers and craftsmen with a limited income, and the purchasing capability of their incomes, while underlining that we represent in the government the Socialist Progressive Party which is concerned with the interests of the popular classes and, consequently, the country's interest and out of our conviction that a statesman must adopt frank positions toward living issues, we announce that we have presented to the Council of Ministers a detailed study on the wheat, flour and bread-pricing policy. The council approved this study in the session held on Wednesday, 13 May 1981. The most important broad lines of this study are summed up in the following:

Selling top-quality white flour to the bakeries at a price of 70 Lebanese piasters per Kg.

We have set the price of the top-quality white flour at 70 piasters per Kg so that bread may be sold to consumers at 150 piasters per Kg.

Junblat added: It must be clear that bread used to be sold to consumers at a price exceeding the new price even though we have been delivering the top-quality white flour to the bakeries at a price of 40 piasters per Kg. Most bakeries have been selling the batch of bread weighing 1,300 grams or less for 2 pounds. We have taken measures to stop the delivery of flour to contravening bakeries and have issued citations against them.

This measure [of raising flour prices] has saved the treasury a sum amounting to 150 [million pounds that can be used in] developmental, educational, health and housing [projects] that will help the citizens overcome the hardships of daily living.

Bread in Homes

Junblat added: In view of the fact that many villagers, especially villagers with a limited income and particularly during crises, turn from purchasing bread from bakeries to baking it at home (over baking tins or in house ovens), thus saving themselves money on the one hand and securing their bread on the other; in view of the fact that the need of such citizens is usually met by supplying them with Australian wheat at cost; in view of the fact that Australian wheat is currently unavailable at the Wheat and Sugarbeet Bureau, despite our contacts with the Australian ambassador to Lebanon to secure the needed quantities without success because the Australian Wheat Bureau is tied to an annual program which has not allocated any quantity for Lebanon; in order to supply flour to the citizens as an alternative to the Australian wheat at cost and without burdening the poor classes and the classes with a limited income; in view of the fact that the citizen often gets his flour at high prices that are far above the set official price because of the limited quantity of the flour available, due to the merchants' greed and exploitation and of the citizens' fears, which are actually misplaced fears; in order to create a balance between supply and demand under the shadow of the strong demand for food supply items and with the approval of the Council of Ministers; we have decided to sell local flour for home-baked bread at cost, namely one Lebanese pound per Kg delivered at the flour mill.

There is no doubt that the citizen will help us implement this measure properly by: not rushing to purchase food supply items out of fear of eruption of food supply crises--our vigilance regarding this issue has produced the best results under the darkest conditions--by purchasing goods only at their declared official prices and by notifying the government of any violation he observes on the part of the merchant or the seller so that legal measures may be taken against contraveners.

Encouraging Wheat Production

The minister added: The question that poses itself in the course of discussing food supply affairs and that occurs to many is: What is the role of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce in encouraging the local production of grains? The truth is that developing the production of grains and insuring the marketing of this production at incentive prices without harming the consumer's interest is one of the ministry's most important tasks and one of the goals which the ministry aspires to realize.

However, the incentive prices approved by the state and the obstacles facing the administration when gathering production, especially under the current conditions, under the competition of alternative crops which yield a higher profit and under the natural [weather] conditions in some years, limit the realization of our aspirations.

Lebanon's wheat production is estimated at 60,000 tons annually, most of which go at present toward the production of crushed wheat [bulgar] and for home reserve supplies. There is no doubt that the plans seeking to increase this production are capable of producing tangible results, if the circumstances contribute to implementing these plans.

Achieving Food Security

Junblat also said: It must be noted that the ministry has tried and continues to try ceaselessly to achieve food security under the present circumstance, employing the following means:

1. Making preparations to adopt special precautionary measures to secure the flour needed in the various parts of the country should the situation become tense and should the activities of ports and of the flour mills come to a halt.

2. During the recent military escalation and intense shelling, we made urgent and persistent contacts with all the parties concerned and were able as a result to neutralize the port and to stop the shelling in its direction. We were thus able to unload 2 ships carrying 77,000 tons of wheat. Without those efforts, the country would have been subjected to a severe food supply crisis.

3. Turning the Beirut Port silo into a means of delivering, and not just storing, grains.

4. Seeking to build stores and silos in every governorate so as to store wheat in a decentralized manner.

5. Supplying the automatic flour mills built in the governorates with enough wheat to meet the governorates' needs.

6. Reassessing the supply program currently in force for the distribution of wheat to the provinces so that the need of most of the governorates may be secured from the flour mills operating in them.

7. Contact was made with the minister of supply in the Syrian Arab Republic to (supply us with a quantity of flour and wheat) under this special circumstance. He has welcomed our request.

Canadian Wheat Deal

As for the Canadian wheat issue, Junblat started by saying: "On 13 June 1980, an agreement was concluded between the Ministry of Economy and Commerce and the Canadian Wheat Council. In accordance with the agreement, the latter pledged to make available to the Ministry of Economy and Commerce a quantity of no less than 1 million metric tons of Canadian wheat, plus or minus 5 percent, provided that this volume be delivered to and loaded from Canadian ports in equal quantities and in five stages, the last to be delivered on 31 October 1985.

"This agreement stipulates in part that The Agro Company of Canada, Ltd. shall be considered an accredited representative of the Canadian Wheat Council."

Junblat then reviewed the actual tangible and legal developments that have accompanied this deal:

First, in implementation of the basic agreement, we asked the Canadian Wheat Council to make the arrangements necessary to insure the delivery of 150,000 metric tons of wheat, plus 5 percent, in accordance with the first stage of the program.

In implementation of the third article of the agreement, The Agro Company of Canada is to insure shipping the wheat to a Lebanese port, provided that it reach agreement with the purchaser (the first party, i.e. the Ministry of Economy and Commerce). This means that the purchaser's approval is conditional and that the shipping contract can only be concluded with his consent and approval.

Article four of the (subcontract) concluded between the Ministry of Economy and Commerce and the company provides a clear and indisputable clarification insofar as the condition stipulated by the third article of the basic agreement, namely the condition of approval, is concerned. Article four states verbatim:

"The second party shall secure for the benefit, at the expense and with the approval of the first party the cargo ships needed for each of the delivery periods noted in the basic agreement...."

The Ministry of Economy and Commerce did not approve the shipping price rate quoted by Agro and amounting to $39.80 because it was high.

This is why the ministry asked the company on 12 February 1981 to reconsider the matter and to make a better and more competitive new offer, or else we would let somebody else with a better offer ship the grain.

On 9 March 1981, the said company responded with a vague letter in which it did not mention modifying its shipping offer. This necessitated sending the company a letter on 14 March 1981 rejecting its offer.

Considering that we had received a letter from the Wheat Council setting the shipping period from 10-30 April 1981 for the first stage of the concluded agreement, in view of the deteriorating security conditions prevalent at the time and to deal with this serious matter, we were faced with two options: Either approve the shipping rates quoted by Agro and amounting to $39.80 per ton or seek other shipping offers in order to select the lowest.

This is why I sought shipping offers from a number of maritime shipping companies which showed the following: 1. The Lebanese Maritime Shipping Company: $37.75 per metric ton. 2. Sa'id Sinnu (maritime company): $38.50. 3. Costa Papadoupolos: $36.80. 4. (Genmar) Shipping Company: $38.75.

Second, in accordance with the provisions of article 147, paragraph A, of the General Accounting Law which permits the minister to conclude agreements by consent upon a decision he issues in case (confidentiality or public safety are involved), we concluded an agreement by consent with Costa Papadoupolos because he had offered the lowest shipping rate ($36.08 per metric ton)--a rate saving the Lebanese treasury nearly 2 million Lebanese pounds in comparison to the rate offered by Agro. This is in addition to other conditional guarantees we inserted in the agreement concluded with Papadoupolos, including the guarantee of raising the bank surety from 10,000 Lebanese pounds (according to the shipping contract concluded last year between the Ministry of Economy and Commerce and the Agro Company) to $100,000.

Third, it must be noted here that the previous contracts to ship the Canadian wheat were concluded with Agro by consent and without any tender or any bids. The controller of expense contracts signed them because they complied with the General Accounting Law and did not present them for prior examination by the Accounting Office.

We must also point out that for several years no shipping contract meeting the necessary legal conditions has been concluded and that what happened is that Agro made its shipping offer and then the minister concerned approved it with a letter noting his acceptance of the offer.

Moreover, the deal to ship the Canadian wheat by Agro in 1980 was on the basis of $39.40 per metric ton whereas the shipping rate we agreed on with Papadoupolos in 1981 was $36.80 per metric ton, i.e. $2.60 lower for each metric ton than the rate offered in 1980.

Fourth, up to this moment and despite the numerous letters we have sent the Canadian Wheat Council to make the wheat available to us, the council has not fulfilled its commitments because it ties the delivery to the condition of binding us to assign Agro, the council's accredited representative, to ship the wheat from the Canadian ports to Beirut Port. This caused us to consider the council's behavior tantamount to a violation of its contractual commitments. Consequently, we sent the council a notification on 21 April 1981 to urge its accredited representative to coordinate with our shipping representative in order to supply the wheat or else we would nullify the said agreement, hold the council accountable for the legal responsibility emanating from such action and for the subsequent damages.

Fifth, some papers have reported that shipping bids were made by some Lebanese maritime companies and that we did not study them legally and select the best to conclude the shipping deal.

To make the truth clear, I must note that before 3 April 1981, i.e. the date on which we concluded the shipping contract with Papadoupolos, no bids other than the ones I have noted were presented to the Ministry of Economy and Trade. The bids presented by maritime agents were made after that date.

We must also point out here that we have at our disposal information indicating that when Agro became certain that there was no chance for a contract with it to ship the wheat, it instigated--in addition to creating frustrating difficulties to obstruct shipping the wheat--a number of Lebanese maritime companies to make these protests and to offer shipping rates lower than the one we had chosen in order to create confusion in the Lebanese public opinion, especially under this critical circumstance.

Sixth, it is worth noting here that the agreement concluded on 13 June 1980 between the Ministry of Economy and Commerce and the Canadian Wheat Council is a 5-year agreement which extends to 13 June 1985, that the quantity of wheat which the Ministry of Economy and Commerce is committed to purchase from this council is within the limits of 750,000 metric tons, plus 5 percent, and that in accordance with the agreement the wheat prices are to be set by the council on the basis of the prevalent warehouse prices.

As a result of the investigations we have conducted regarding wheat prices in the international markets, it has become evident to us that in case this agreement is nullified wheat can be purchased from these markets at a price that is $25 lower per metric ton than the price imposed by the agreement, in addition to $10 saved in shipping fares and from Agro's commission. This means that there is a difference of $35 per metric ton.

For example, if we purchase in one consignment the 750,000 tons of wheat, plus the 5 percent, to which we are committed in accordance with this agreement, we would save the Lebanese treasury nearly $28 million or about 120 million Lebanese pounds.

Seventh, thanks to the sound position we took in the face of Agro's insistence on not delivering the wheat to our accredited shipping agent, this company sent us a telex cable on 13 May 1981 making a new offer to ship 150,000 metric tons of wheat, plus 5 percent (the subject matter of the first stage of the agreement with the Canadian Wheat Council) at the rate of $35.60 per metric ton, i.e. at a rate that is $4.20 lower than its previous offer of $39.80 per metric ton on which it had insisted in all its previous communications.

Eighth, we accuse strongly those who have attacked us and criticized our legally sound conduct regarding this issue because some of them are middlemen and commission agents whose goal is to exploit this situation in order to void this deal and to award it to their agents. Others have suspect and close ties with Agro.

Ninth, I have decided to present this issue with all its details to the Council of Ministers so that it may adopt the proper decision on it because the council is the authority which approved the basic agreement and the subcontract emanating from it in accordance with Council of Ministers decree No 13, dated 23 June 1979.

At the end of the press conference, the minister of economy and trade reviewed the measures adopted by the ministry to protect the consumer and the citations it has issued against those tampering with prices and weights.

Questions and Answers

The minister then answered the following questions:

[Question] Are there specific measures to force the bakeries to abide by the new prices, especially since they have failed to abide so far by any prices set by the ministry?

[Answer] There are measures that will accompany the implementation of this pricing and that provide for denying any contravening bakery its flour share. The efforts of the controllers will focus in this period on implementing the decision of the Council of Ministers and on seeing that the Kg of bread is sold for 150 piasters.

[Question] It has become evident as a result of application of the food program that the country's wheat need is less than 360,000 tons annually and that this figure includes the quantities smuggled to be sold as fodder. What is your opinion?

[Answer] The truth is that the country's need is less than the said figure. We will exert efforts to reduce this figure after banning the exportation of fodders and after putting an end to the waste in the flour mills.

[Question] It is well known that the Canadian wheat agreement has been concluded with the ministry for a number of years. Why wasn't the Agro issue brought up until the present?

[Answer] The deal was usually concluded by consent between the ministry, Agro Company and the Canadian Wheat Council and was renewed annually. When I familiarized myself with the contents of the agreement and of its supplement, it became evident that the ministry could get better conditions at lower prices.

For example, the Canadian wheat agreement makes no reference to protein [content] in the wheat and neglects other aspects pertaining to wheat humidity and specific weight.

[Question] How will you supply wheat similar in quality to the Canadian wheat in case the Council of Ministers agrees to abolish the agreement with Canada?

[Answer] There are better kinds of wheat than the Canadian wheat and they are not difficult to get.

[Question] Some Lebanese maritime shipping companies say that they have made price offers that have not been taken into consideration. What is the truth?

[Answer] The truth is that when we invited bids, only four offers were made. We took the least expensive. All the price offers made afterward came after the bidders had learnedof the rate offered by the company given the shipping contract and, consequently, after we had made public the name of the accredited company [meaning Papadoupolos].

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NATIONAL MOVEMENT CONSIDERS IDEA OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

Local Administration: Idea or Program

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 25-31 May 81 pp 17-18

[Article by Wadi' al-Hilu]

[Text] The statement about local administration in the national area that was made by the secretary general of the Lebanese Communist party, Mr George Hawi aroused feelings of grief and sorrow. Many people, even those in the National Movement, would have preferred these feelings to have remained behind the scenes. The subject that aroused negative reactions in the Amal Movement first, in Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam second and in the various Islamic agencies third--even though it was overshadowed by regional events and by the local upheaval in security--remains an extremely significant local indicator regarding the future situation in Lebanon.

What are the sources of the National Movement saying?

The explanation that was made by Mr George Hawi conveyed some kind of affirmation that the Lebanese National Movement will not sit with tied hands in the face of the government's continued "absence", "reluctance" or "negligence" [to act] in the areas that are not subject to the Phalangists' control. Among the statements he made in the "explanation" was one that the National Movement may be called upon to take measures to ensure that the unification forces hold out against the forces of partition. This means that the National Movement will shift to [a position] that takes reality into consideration. It will help the state and its agencies wherever it thinks that is possible, and it will try to "fill the gap" in other areas by assuming the position of the state where the government is absent. To the circles of observers in Beirut the expression used by the secretary general of the Communist party, "The National Movement may be called upon," signifies that the coming stage may show developments which presume that the National Movement would play such a role. The reason, or the compelling reasons [for this], are "the continued control by the Phalangist party over an area in the absence of the lawful

government and the affirmation that the struggle is intra-Lebanese and that the national forces have to play their part to affirm the unity and the Arab character of Lebanon. Third, the political struggle which the National Movement adopted failed to achieve its objectives, and fighting partition and the proponents of partition makes it incumbent that there be more than political statements which are issued from time to time."

The sources of the National Movement indicate that what the secretary general of the Communist party expressed was in fact an idea which has not yet been turned into a practical program that can be implemented. These sources add that this idea was discussed in the meetings of the National Movement and that at the outset some people voiced reservations based on the consideration that the opportunity must be made available to the lawful government to play its full role and that there would be no solution to the crisis of Lebanon's unity without a lawful government. However, with the developments that have been experienced recently on the Lebanese scene, which, in the opinion of the sources of the National Movement, affirmed "the control of the Phalangist party over a Lebanese area and the total absence of the government in other areas," the reservations that had been voiced by some people were dropped, and serious thought began to be given to administering the affairs of living, earning a living and security in the areas that are not controlled by the Phalangists. [This occurred], along with all the measures that would follow, under the slogan of unifying Lebanon and preserving its Arab character.

The idea itself goes back to 1976. At that time the National Movement had approved the idea in response to a Lebanese Front plan. Action on that idea had stopped after the entry of the Syrian troops into Lebanon and the onset of the so-called political solution and the renunciation of the military solution. Among the reasons for going back to the new-old plan, according to the explanation of Mr George Hawi, may be the fact that the accord talks of B'abda Palace have reached a dead end.

However, National Movement sources are affirming that the discussions on the need for "all the national forces" to administer the affairs of the areas that are not subject to Phalangist party control do not mean that the "idea" has been turned into a "program." What is currently being proposed is no more than an idea to be considered as part of the groundwork for making preparations for the future and anticipating what may happen in case the plan for a political solution to the Lebanese crisis fails. National Movement sources are affirming that the movement does not want to monopolize the right to have direct oversight over the affairs of citizens. Instead, it will try to involve the other national forces, among which are the Amal Movement, the Islamic Council and [former] president, Sulaymen Franjiyyah. As Mr George Hawi said, "It is known that this will not relieve the others of their responsibilities." The reference to "the others" is a reference to the Palestinian Resistance and Syria.

One of the leaders of the National Movement summarizes the situation as follows: "So far the efforts [that have been made] for accord have not been fruitful. The lawful government does not do anything to solve the

problems that plague the citizens in the areas which are not subject to the control of the Phalangist party. All this [is taking place] while the struggle continues inside Lebanon between the forces of partition and the forces of unification. If the forces of partition are able to get control over an area, the forces of unification must struggle to overthrow their control over that area. This presumes that there is a return to the armed struggle under the slogan of unifying Lebanon."

It is evident that "the idea" which has not yet ripened and turned into a program is, in the opinion of many, a continuation of the political program that had been previously proposed by the National Movement. So far "the idea" is still being presented in the context of what we may call an interest in citizens' social and security affairs and in the context of helping the government, but not in the context of infringing upon it. Despite this clarification, to which George Hawi and a number of National Movement leaders referred, the fact of the matter indicates that "the idea" clashed with the position of those who do not see the matter in the same light.

Mr Nabih Barri, secretary general of the Amal Movement has a different opinion. He regards every discussion of a local administration in the national areas to be tantamount to [discussion of] partition. Consequently, such discussion is rejected wholly and categorically. As far as he is concerned fighting partition is to be carried out in the context of a single framework, which is that of the Lebanese legal authority. The state's ability to resume its responsibilities means first and foremost scuttling the partition plan. Hence Barri affirms that the Amal Movement supports the legal authority and is determined that it pursue its responsibilities as the sole possible framework for bringing an end to the Lebanese crisis. Barri also affirms that there is no other alternative and that, accordingly, partition cannot be fought by measures of a divisive nature even if those measures were to proclaim the slogan of unification. For according to the opinion of the secretary general of the Amal Movement, the legal authority is the best slogan for unifying Lebanon and scuttling the partition plan. "This has been the position of the movement since 1976, and it still is." However, if the subject at hand is one of facilitating social affairs for citizens, Barri says that any charitable society can carry out this function.

The substance of the reply made by the various Islamic agencies was similar, and the case was the same with regard to Prime Minister Salam. This led to remarks that "the idea" would not see the light of the day. But what if the current situation were to continue, and what if the security conditions were to deteriorate, as is evident? Is there anything to prevent "the idea" from being turned into "a program?"

At any rate the idea is still in need of [some] clarification. This means that the discussions of the National Movement will not be completed soon. The National Movement has to come to a clear conclusion that determines how the Phalangist "autonomy" can be fought without falling into the trap of partition. It will have to determine if a "unification" war would virtually eliminate the partition war, and who would pay the price in both cases.

The question remains unanswered.

Prospects for Unity Mixed

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 23 May 81 p 17

[Text] Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam, one of the chief figures of the Islamic Grouping, and Mr Walid Junblat, chairman of the Political Council of the Lebanese National Movement, have agreed to reject and oppose any trend that advocates the establishment of autonomous administrations in the Lebanese areas that are outside the control of the Phalangist party. These areas are commonly called the national areas.

Ever since the beginning of President Ilyas S[illegible]'s term these national areas have remained subject to the administration of the state and the legal authorities. This was based on an ideological position which the National Movement had assumed. It had rejected all forms of partition of all forms that would lead to partition, and it had decided on that basis to support the legal authority and its institutions and to provide the opportunity to the state administrations to play their role fully in running and administering public affairs.

This position of the National Movement has always distinguished itself from the positions of the Phalangist party which has always been trying to subject the areas that it controls to autonomous administrations, especially with regard to security.

The self-policing experiment that was pursued by the Phalangist party with the supervision of the commander of the Phalangist military militia, al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, did succeed to a certain extent, especially after this party gained military control over the areas where it can be found at present. This experiment was even envied by some of the leaders of the National Movement, especially its president, Walid Junblat who once said in a press interview, "Shaykh Bashir is lucky because he can control security in his areas, contrary to what exists in ours."

Until that day when the battle of Zahlah and Beirut erupted, the plan to establish autonomous administrations in the areas that are subject to the National Movement along the lines of those administrations in the areas that are subject to Phalangist party control, was being discussed by National Movement leaders who are allied with the Palestinian Resistance.

The secretary general of the Lebanese Communist Party, George Hawi made statements in which he declared that the National Movement may now be called upon to take a series of necessary measures to administer the national areas so as to make up for the inadequacy of the legal authorities.

Mr Nawi revealed that an agreement had been reached during the recent meetings of the National Movement whose objective is to confront the divisive situation that now exists in the Phalangist areas. This calls for guaranteeing the broadest national, political, security and military cohesiveness in the areas that are not subject to Phalangist control.

After affirming that the purpose of this step is not to replace existing state institutions, Mr Nawi said that the deliberations on accord that took place recently at B'abda Palace were set on a dead end course as a result of Israeli intervention, Phalangist intransigence and the government's cover-up of these positions which are opposed to the accord in practice. The efforts we made to advocate support for President Ilyas Sarkis and his governments and institutions so that the lawful government could formulate a national solution have been in vain.

Prime Minister Salam opposed this proposal and said that it was rejected wholly and categorically and that one cannot be silent about it. He said that it was being rejected wholly, especially since it was being made by the National Movement which should have rid itself beforehand of the corruption of those factions whose conduct causes the people pain. Its president, Walid Junblat had declared repeatedly his denunciation and his condemnation of these factions' deviant practices which we will not describe again here. The proposal is also basically rejected because one cannot respond to the divisive measures that are carried out by the Phalangist militias by proposing similar divisive measures modeled after the pattern of what happened in the past: establishing a so-called civilian administration which at the time yielded uncivil and immoral practices.

Prime Minister Salam concluded the statement he made about this subject by saying that those who live in non-Phalangist areas are opposed to any form of partition and do not accept what the Phalangist militias are doing in the areas that the Phalangists control. How then can they accept something similar in their areas?

It so happened that Prime Minister Salam had made that statement after a visit which the head of government, Shafiq al-Wazzan had paid him. It was during that visit that the discussion had turned to that subject.

After that Prime Minister Salam contacted Mr Walid Junblat, who was in al-Mukhtarah, by telephone. He agreed with him that this trend was to be resisted and strongly opposed and that an effort was to be made to assume common positions that would strengthen the institutions of the state and its legal departments.

8592
CSO: 4304/17

NAVAL ACADEMY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS STATIONS PLANNED

Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRYA-PRESS in French 9 May 81 pp 8-9

[Text] Tripoli, 18 May (JAMAHIRYA NEWS AGENCY)--The secretary of the general people's committee for communications and sea transport signed a contract yesterday evening with an international company for the construction of a naval academy. In accordance with this contract, the company will complete this project in two stages.

During the first period, the administrative offices, the library, classrooms able to accommodate between 400 and 600 students in the higher education field, a theater, a restaurant and several annexes will be constructed.

As for the second period, it will be devoted to the erection of a building intended to house a planetarium, a medical center, a mosque and residential quarters for the students and the teaching staff, as well as rooms for sports activities, a swimming pool and a club.

During this second period, a port will also be built, including an enclosure, a quay equipped with ship-unloading devices, maintenance shipyards, a control tower, general annexes, as well as antiwave barrages.

The completion of this contract will take 36 months.

The secretary of the general people's committee for communications and land transport also signed a contract with an international company specializing in the exploration and construction of ground telecommunications stations.

[words illegible] the execution of this project will take close to 23 months, at the end of which these stations will be able to transmit television and radio programs and set up telephone lines and telegraph stations in underdeveloped regions.

9434
CSO: 4519/5

BRIEFS

NUCLEAR ENGINEER TRAINEES--Some 30 Libyan specialists are now taking courses in nuclear engineering at a Finnish nuclear research center near Helsinki. The Finns have contracted to build two 440-megawat nuclear power plants of the Soviet type in Libya. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 29 Jun 81 p 31]

UREA PLANT--Rome (AFP)--It was learned on 20 April that a consortium of two Italian companies and one German company for project study and development had been awarded a contract for the turnkey construction of a urea-manufacturing plant at Marsa El Brega (Libya). The contract has a value of $150 million. [Text] [Paris SAHARA in French 2 May 81 p 20] 9434

PASSENGER PLANES ORDERED--Amsterdam (AFP)--The Netherlands aeronautical manufacturer Fokker has received an order for the delivery of eight F-27 Friendship airplanes to the Libyan airline company Libyan Arab Airlines, according to a communique issued on 20 April by Fokker in Amsterdam. [Text] [Paris SAHARA in French 2 May 81 p 20] 9434

WWII MINE SEARCH--Sirt, 1 Jun (JAMAHIRYA NEWS AGENCY)--A civil defense team yesterday started large-scale search operations for land and underwater mines planted west of the Sirt region during the Second World War. Indeed the Libyan Arab people have continued to suffer from the destructive aftermath of this war. The civil defense team has extended its operations to the regions of Wachka and Zaafarane, which are considered to be among the largest mine fields and which recently experienced several incidents due to explosions of mines placed during the Second World War, causing fairly extensive material damage in the region. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRYA-PRESS in French 1 Jun 81 p 5] 9434

METHANOL PRODUCTION--Adjabia, 20 May (JAMAHIRYA NEWS AGENCY)--Production at the al-Buraygah region methanol factory reached 96,474 tons during the first quarter of this year, at the rate of 1,000 tons per day. These quantities are intended for export. During the previous year some 322,233 tons of methanol were produced. This product is essential, it should be stated, for the plastics and maintenance products industries. It is also essential for the production of proteins needed for cat production. Sources in the National Petrochemical Company administration, linked with the heavy industry secretariat, state that the factory had begun production of this material as early as 1977. For that matter, it holds second place in North Africa. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRYA-PRESS in French 21 May 81 p 8] 9434

SOCIAL SERVICE PLANS--Benghazi, 20 May (JAMAHIRYA NEWS AGENCY)--Sources at the people's social security committee in the al-Jabal al-Akhdar (Green Mountain) municipality reported that a center has been opened to accommodate a computer especially intended for that office, as part of the efforts to improve it's services. These sources added that there are still many projects under way, among them a child welfare center, another for senior citizens, including a nursing home, a library and training workshops where the elderly can carry out some do-it-yourself jobs. A dining room and a club in the al-Sagiyah child welfare center in the city of Sunah are said to be under construction. At Massah, selection of a construction site for a handicapped children's center is under way. It was also learned that a garage planned for the vehicles of the social security office in the al-Jabal al-Akhdar municipality had been completed. This garage includes, among others, a gas station, maintenance workshops, a car wash, as wel' as other services. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRYA-PRESS in French 20 May 81 p 8] 9434

CSO: 4519/5

SURVEY COVERS PROBLEMS FOREIGN WORKERS RAISE, ENDURE

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 10 Jun 81 p 6

/Article by Ahmad al-Duwayhi: "Foreign Labor and Saudi Society"/

/Text/ Society is going through tremendous stages of development.

To carry out these stages of development, we had to decide to seek help from foreign expertise, if only for a limited time, to participate in the development programs.

The public and private sectors have actually started to bring in foreign labor without previously determining its identity. Since this labor did not meet with specific difficulties at the start, we have seen nationalities proliferate and have come to mingle with tremendous numbers of people in various occupational fields.

They have all come with the purpose of taking part in the development programs and the comprehensive upsurge which the kingdom is going through.

The competent bodies have sought to facilitate measures to bring people in on behalf of the citizen--specifically the citizen who belongs to the private sector--paving the way for him to bring in cheap manpower from any country he wishes!

It is this point specifically which has raised difficulties and has received its share of treatment, to the point where it seemed, on the verge of gradually disappearing.

There remains one point which we will review here, which in the course of this report will make itself very conspicuous as a bewildering question which needs a convincing answer. This concerns the number of these foreigners and the range of their nationalities.

Because these foreign nationalities have attached themselves closely to Saudi society in tremendous numbers, positive results, and the opposite, have resulted from this intermingling in the course of work in the public and private sector both.

To give us a full picture, what are the most conspicuous of the positive and negative results?

While we can ascertain these results here only through statements by members of these groups, citizens and foreigners alike, we might be able to infer a few features of this influence, some of which arise in the form of individual concerns.

Therefore, if possible, we will try to ascertain this influence by meeting with the parties involved.

Saudi society is striving to catch up with the transfer of civilization which the kingdom is witnessing in various fields.

By virtue of his proliferating demands and needs, the individual's burdens have increased and he has sought the aid of foreigners in his home and in his own work. This tendency is dominant among people working in the private sector.

Their Statements:

AL-RIYAD, in its investigation into the consequences of this intermingling, has listened to citizens from every sector. Here by sectors it means those which have sought the aid of manpower both in their areas of work and in their homes, for instance in the form of drivers and servants.

A Common Way of Thinking

The citizen S. Ahmad, who owns a paint store, states, "I am living in the midst of a society which is active in building and construction and my contact with foreigners and citizens is therefore constant.

"I employ Arab and--an expression I hope is not odious--foreign manpower. Unfortunately, we deal with these brethren in an atmosphere remote from that of worker and proprietor. Rather, these foreign brothers deal with us from a singe premise, which is that we have money and do not know how to use it.

The Worker Is Deceitful and Is Bonded

"I had one of them here a few months ago and I put him in charge of my money, with the result that he started to know more about it than I did, as a consequence of this confidence I had in him. Unfortunately, he was not the proper object of this trust!

"He made the best use of it--but from his standpoint.

"He was working behind my back and I didn't know it!

"When the truth became known, it also became known that he was 'bonded' for everything and that he had nothing I could hold him to account for!

"However, I am certain that he exploited me and this in general is the attitude of some of the foreign manpower that lives in our midst."

He went on to say:

"The great numbers of these people can be estimated, and one can count their forms and nationalities. Each of them has a specific style of living and a specific

character, and some of them are not like others. You will find two people in our society living together but they will differ in their nature, their customs and their conduct; in general, Saudi society can only be affected by some of these foreigners' customs. My hope is that we will take what they have that benefits us and leave what does not benefit us."

These Are Their Mistakes along with Their Positive Features

The citizen Ahmad S., who works as a merchant in the al-Batha' market, also spoke, saying "I also am in close contact with the market and have direct contact with foreigners.

"I will express an opinion regarding them and I hope that some of our foreign brothers who live amongst us will receive this with an open heart, as we have received them with open hearts, because the situation is a real one and there is no room for us to be angry at their presence for no reason!

"The presence of these brethren in our midst may have its benefits, without a doubt, for us and for them; we need to have them participate with us, and they may be getting more from us than they are earning. Unfortunately, they have not appreciated the good humor which characterizes this society. Every day you hear and observe acts of deceit and violations which some foreign workers commit against this society. There is no doubt that the rule does not apply to the group--large numbers of them deserve respect because they are fully aware of the role which they came to play and they know the degree of the confidence the society has placed in them. Therefore they do not do things which can only damage them and others. You can say that the labor that exists in our midst differs as the customs and innate natures of their peoples differ.

"The different nature of these peoples' customs results in conflict with our customs. In my opinion, whoever says that the presence of Arabs in our midst is less damaging than that of foreigners is wrong for more than one reason!

"Perhaps that is not strange, when you realize that Arab societies are full of contradictions and have many negative features which might be reflected upon our society by virtue of the fact that some individuals from those societies are present in our midst!

"There is no need for me to state here that these groups are increasing, but let me ask you about some of the changes which have occurred or have arisen recently in our society--in a very short period of time when measured in years. In particular, with the presence of foreign labor, you do not /gic/ hear of 'baksheesh,' for example, or 'commissions.' You do not hear certain 'hypocritical' words which are almost endemic among us today. More than that, we are almost losing some parts of our heritage. For example, jokes--we have ceased to hear them because of the nature of two Arab countries whose workers are abundant in our midst. The same is the case with maxims and sayings.

"Doesn't this society even have maxims and sayings?"

The merchant Ahmad went on to say, "I can give you an example in practical reality which is rather appropriate: in years past, did you see people surging like waves

through the marketplace at prayer time? Not until a short time ago. Now unfortunately, you see lines of these foreigners waiting on the sidewalks until people emerge from prayer. These groups are strange to us because now everyone goes to the nearest mosque when prayer time comes."

Dangers from Them in Homes

We listen to another voice, which said:

"My responsibilities accumulated some time ago, and I had to think about bringing in a maid and a driver. In fact, the need still exists, but a short time ago, in addition to the warnings I had been hearing, I saw something that made me hesitate or let's say lose interest in this idea of bringing in servants." He went on to say:

"I work as a government employee and I derive benefit from some activities outside the framework of work since the burdens of the children have increased. When I am at work they need people to take them to school, then bring them back home, and in this situation we need a driver.

"The children's mother, for her part, needs a servant to help her with the burdens of the children and the home. However, maids entail risks. We can bear some of the risk involved in the fact that they mix with some of the members of the society.

"You find that these certain people do not hesitate to employ these maids in male society. The maids /line missing/.

"I have noticed that some friends' maids, and those of some acquaintances as well, serve meals to their guests!

"This is not a simple problem which might have some dangers--its dangers are serious!"

The View from the Other Side

We had to listen to the view of the other side which is concerned with the effects and influences, namely that of the foreign workers present among us.

I have heard different views all of which talk about the genuine nature of this society, its exalted character and its innocence of the social ills certain other societies are experiencing.

No one has forgotten that the manifestations of the innocence of this society are the inevitable result of the conditions of the regime here, the qualities it enjoys and the strong faith Saudi society is graced with.

A foreigner working in the private sector says, "I have spent about 4 years and 1 month in Saudi Arabia so far, and the fact is that I have managed to become acquainted with Saudi society from within during this period because it is a simple society which a person can become familiar with quickly if he can acclimatize himself to it.

"During the preceding period of my work, I felt nothing strange and met with no unpleasantness from anyone. In fact, I was dealt with well. In the recent period the manager of the department, that is, the manager of the company's department, was changed, the course of the company's activities assumed a stable course, and its interests diversified.

"When my vacation time came this company's manager refused to give me my vacation--in fact, he went beyond that, and refused to give me my pay for my vacation and for the last 3 months.

"At the outset I dealt mildly with him; then he refused the exit and return /visa applications/. He also refused the final exit /application/ until I waived all the rights this company owed me, including the travel fare. Therefore, I am seeking recourse with the Labor Office. This unfortunate conduct is not one of the characteristic of this society. In general the people are good, and these problems are simple and are not a criterion of anything."

We heard another opinion, which held that "Bluntness and truth make it mandatory that we say that we can obtain our rights everywhere, from ordinary citizens or officials.

"I consider that all the problems that occur are only deviations, as in relations in all societies among workers and employers, but there are no problems which cause this society discomfort, as you read or hear in some countries that seek the help of foreign labor."

My Sponsor is Usurping My Rights

We heard another view which represented a different type of the foreign labor in the country, in other words one not linked in any way to this society by heritage, even religious beliefs. The person said:

"My problem is that my sponsor has refused to give me concessions and is refusing to give me the rest of my salary now that I have finished a period here during which I did a great deal for my sponsor, materially, of course, and in terms of work experience."

Individual Saudis Are Responsible

We heard another view on the process of being influenced by the society from someone working in the government sector. He said,

"Because of the circumstances of my work, I deal with Saudi brethren in official capacities. However, I have an observation which I hope you, and the Saudi brethren also, will accept as sincere advice.

"This concerns what is going on in Saudi society. The fact is that it is difficult for me to observe that some of the customs and beautiful things we used to see a few years ago when we came here have begun to start disappearing.

"The fact is that I hold the Saudi individual responsible specifically. Foreign drivers generally come from environments which are far removed from responsibility

and they are generally the least, in fact the worst, class anywhere; Saudi individuals for their part ought to assume the responsibilities of their home themselves first without leaving that up to foreign drivers.

"This is part of the problem, but there are most emphatically many negative aspects, although positive features exist.

"Let me ask you, if you please:

"We have advanced to this point, and each of us knows his responsibilities.

"The labor you have, specifically from the Arab countries, knows and is fully aware of what it means to have come to Saudi Arabia, of course we know about the system, the mores and the traditions that exist in your midst, and I personally respect them--in fact I wish they existed in my society and my country in general.

"However, let me ask you another question. Why do you attach little importance to the disappearance of your beautiful customs?

"You are the cause.

"Therefore you give everyone an opportunity!

"The people on contract are not all at fault. You must be fair to us. How concerned are you over your society?"

Another foreign brother voiced an opinion. He said:

"First I would like to record my objection to the fact that people coming from Arab countries are called 'foreigners.' An Arab coming from Jordan, Lebanon or the Sudan cannot be equated with someone coming from Sri Lanka, Thailand or the Phillippines, at least in designation! However, in my opinion, Arab citizens are able, by virtue of proximity, a common language and of course religious faith, to have an effect on the society here, negatively or positively.

"In general, Saudi society is still preserving its chastity as a genuinely Arab nation and preserving its tolerant faith, its traditions and its heritage in spite of the tremendous 'shift' it is going through.

"The first thing that attracted my attention when I came to Riyadh was the chaos in the traffic and the lack of respect for traffic regulations. One sight which has become common here is the presence of delapidated cars traveling about without embarrassment on Riyadh's beautiful streets. Sometimes you find the exhaust pipes behind these cars trailing their black poisons in the streets without any supervision, so that you would imagine that there was a fire burning in them! This is in addition to the speed limits, which are not observed inside the town or outside it. Then there are the potholes and the artificial excavations which give no proof of civilized quality. I believe that the Traffic /Department/ has an obligation which it has not been able to carry out as thoroughly as it could. A glance at the figures on traffic victims will suffice.

"The kingdom has now started to aspire to a pioneering Arab and Islamic role. This may be attributed to the fact that the most sacred Islamic sites exist in it, and to its economic weight and the balanced policies of the Saudi leaders in the Arab, Islamic and international contexts. In this regard, let us not forget to mention the support the kingdom has given to the Palestinian revolutionaries and their cause, which is the cause of all of us.

"In brief, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now occupying a lofty international status and has become the object of attention of Arabs and Moslems in all countries.

"I have noted that some of these Saudi brethren sometimes look upon Arab citizens with a disdainful and lordly eye. I do not know the reason for this attitude. Perhaps it may be attributed to the behavior of some Arab citizens who have come in and tried to amass the greatest possible amount of wealth in the shortest period of time."

Let me conclude this subject with the opinion of one of these people, who said:

"Naturally I am not in a position which would enable me to talk or comment on aspects which sociology designates as 'democracy,' 'social effect,' 'social groups,' what are called 'social positions' or the 'group spirit,' or other expressions sociologists use. Perhaps, however, as far as 'public taste' goes, through superficial observations, or 'group' or individual conduct,' through the interplay of an awareness which has been summed up in a period no greater than 5 months as a result of the rapid growth of my acquaintance with some young people, so that on some occasions there has been a deep friendship with representative persons in this context which, in some cases, has progressed to the point where I have passed into the family situation--in fact has extended beyond the boundaries of the neighborhood--Saudi Arab society, like all Arab societies, in fact because it is their ethnic foundation, consists of entities distributed in areas with geographical or regional boundaries, in the context of single families, of course, and over areas which differ in proximity or distance, and sometimes great distance, although this distance affects the unity of mores, traditions and social customs only in relatively minor fashion which I will soon talk about.

"I have been invited to a number of social occasions through which I managed to discover, or, more precisely, 'see' much of the genuine nature of this society, and this is making a radical correction of the 'conception' that had existed within me before what you call assimilation occurred.

"My impression may be summarized as follows:

"No change has occurred in basic traditions and customs, in villages or towns, except to a modest degree, as I mentioned, in spite of this society's intermixture--to an extent unparalleled in any country in the world--with a tremendous number of people who have absolutely no interest in any way in Arab society. This proves the degree to which this society holds its customs dear and sticks stubbornly to its traditions, considering that these Islamic customs and traditions must prevail, that they are better than and take priority over immersion in other societies, whatever they may be, and consequently that these societies with which it is in constant contact in terms of knowledge and coexistence lack its own traditions and customs.

"This is from the standpoint of customs and traditions. However, from the standpoint of individual conduct, in terms of negative aspects, my observations on this are that someone studying this angle closely will find that there is an amazing and astonishing contradiction at the same time, since while he sees in some people the utmost liberalism, politeness, tolerance and genuineness and the most exemplary gracious qualities, in others on the other hand he finds a terrible contrary nature to which nothing matters. It is as if that nature had come in from the jungle and has no interest at all in being a human living and coexisting with man on this earth, is loaded down with masses of complexes and is living on its wits, walking as if to cross over the land and climb high mountains. In these two groups, or categories, you will not find any difference between young people and people about to reach their dotage!

"This group also represents what is called 'the proletariat,' but not on the scale that is to be found in other Arab or foreign societies. This group is limited and restricted and may exist in the context of some towns.

"Regarding the vexations some people meet with, resulting from the fact that they are looked upon as foreigners, this, in my view, is natural, and is mutual to those causing the vexation and those suffering from it, since that generally results from their interaction in a 'common complex.'

"The former faces someone about whom he knows nothing, in terms of behavior, morals or social class, while the latter is basically gripped by feelings of 'foreignness.'

"However, beyond that, except for that, people are spontaneously dealt with in a context noted for mutual understanding, along with the negative and positive concomitants of this interaction."

11887
CSO: 4304/30

EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN MIDEAST PEACE EFFORT URGED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 10 Jun 81 p 4

[Article: "The Emirates Confirms Rejection of Camp David Accords and the Need for Europe's Participation in the Settlement of the Area's Crisis in the Official Talks between the Emirates and the European Market"]

[Text] The United Arab Emirates has confirmed its unshakable, ideological position on the Palestinian question by [affirming] the need to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to determine their own destiny and establish their independent state and by affirming that the PLO is the legitimate and the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

This statement was made by 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Jarwan, deputy minister of foreign affairs.

Al-Jarwan said that this affirmation was made during the official talks that were held yesterday morning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between the United Arab Emirates' delegation led by Rashid 'Abdallah, the minister of state for foreign affairs and the delegation of the European Common Market countries led by Christoph A. van der Klaauw, the Netherlands' minister of foreign affairs and the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the European Common Market countries.

After the talks session ended, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Jarwan said that the United Arab Emirates' delegation emphasized that what the Palestinian people accepted was reinforced and supported by the Arab Emirates. [He said] there would be no peaceful solution to the Middle East question unless there is total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab lands, especially Jerusalem, and [recognition of] the right of the Palestinian people to establish their own state on their land. This [position] is based on the resolutions of recent Arab summit conferences.

He said that the United Arab Emirates' delegation affirmed that keeping Jerusalem under Arab control would enable the followers of the three religions to worship freely. He said that the Arabs have always been more capable of preserving freedom for the divine religions.

Al-Jarwan explained that the United Arab Emirates' delegation refuted the Zionist enemy's allegations regarding Israeli security to the delegation of the European Common Market countries.

He said that recent events carried out by the Zionist enemy, [namely] bombing the Iraqi nuclear reactor, did emphasize Israel's aggressive and expansionist intentions. This confirms the false character of Israel's claim that it needs to protect its security.

'Abd-al-Rahman al-Jarwan said that the United Arab Emirates confirmed its rejection of the Camp David agreement during the talks session. The Emirates stated that no agency can speak for the Palestinian people or negotiate on their behalf.

The United Arab Emirates' delegation also emphasized the need for Europe's participation in settling the Middle East problem, provided that the European trend differ from the U.S. point of view because the U.S. initiative falls within the context of the Camp David agreement.

Al-Jarwan said that the United Arab Emirates' delegation expressed the hope that there be a change in the European position in favor of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, despite the fact that the United Arab Emirates did support the Venice Declaration regarding the Middle East question.

At the conclusion of his statement 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Jarwan affirmed that Dr Klaauw's tour was being made in the context of visiting a number of Middle East countries to find out their opinions and to gather the facts about the possibilities that the countries of the European Common Market have to undertake an initiative to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute. Dr Klaauw would submit a report [on his tour] to the European Council of Ministers.

On the other hand Dr Klaauw affirmed the need to find a quick solution to the Palestinian question because whenever a solution to this question is postponed, [such an action] is not in the interests of the Palestinian people.

He indicated that the Common Market countries cannot put pressure on Israel, and he emphasized that the countries of the European Common Market have not recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Dr Klaauw affirmed the need for coordination between the European positions and the position of the United States regarding the efforts that are aimed at a solution to the Middle East crisis. "However, this does not mean that Europe does not have its own ideas on the subject, and especially on the need to give the Palestinian people their right to determine their own destiny."

Dr Klaauw said, "We are coordinating [our efforts] and negotiating with the United States because it does not recognize the Palestinians' right to determine their own destiny, a right which the countries of the European Common Market recognize."

ADFAED LOANS INCREASED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 25, 22 Jun 81 p 5

[Text]

Reports from the UAE last week suggested that there was some concern over the recent spate of dollar purchases on the local market, prompting Central Bank intervention to maintain Dirham liquidity levels. Although little or no official information was available, it was clear there were fears of a renewed run on the Dirham, as happened in 1977.

The Abu Dhabi-based Arabic daily *Al-Ittihad* recently reported record levels of dollar purchases because of the unfavourable interest rates on the Dirham. According to the daily, local banks have been offering interest ranging between 6.5 and 10.5 per cent on the Dirham, compared to between 15.1 and 17.5 per cent on the dollar.

The Governor of the UAE Central Bank commented on the reports by saying that the government was taking a series of measures to maintain Dirham liquidity. These, he added, include encouraging local investment and tightening the gap between dollar and Dirham interest rates.

A similar crisis occurred in 1977 when the-then central monetary authority, the UAE Currency Board, tried to stem a flight of capital because of more advantageous investment returns in foreign currencies and a general run on the Dirham which led to bankruptcy of two banks. The Currency Board was empowered to regulate banking and monetary operations as a result including such measures as banning the creation of new banks, reviewing financial institutions' operations, increasing mandatory reserve levels and restricting credit.

Nevertheless, some fundamental problems highlighted by the 1977 crisis remain, notably the inability of the Currency Board to draw on reserves deposited by commercial banks and consequently a lack of adequate control on credit.

Meanwhile, the high value of the dollar seems to have some beneficial effects for consumers, who are reported to be paying lower prices for certain imported items. According to reports by the Dubai-based *Gulf News*, the cost of imported cars has notably benefited from the high price of the dollar coupled with the stability of the Dirham's purchasing power.

A sample survey conducted by the paper revealed that the retail price of one of the French Renault models has dropped by Dirhams 7,000 to Dirhams 40,500 ($12,240) in the space of a week. Lower range models were now being sold at Dirhams 20,000 ($5,400), the paper said, compared to the earlier price of Dirhams 24,500 ($6,664).

CSO: 4300/24

FEDERAL NATIONAL COUNCIL DISCUSSES LEGISLATION

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 10 Jun 81 pp 5, 6

[Article by Ahmad Muhsin: "Water Resources and Communicable Diseases Laws Approved in Emotional Session of the Federal National Council"]

[Text] Al-Raqbani says, "I am giving up in front of you my responsibility to head the Supreme Water Resources Organization."

At the outset everything indicated that the session of the Federal National Council would be a quiet one and that it would not last long.

The federal bill regarding the establishment of the Supreme Organization for Managing Water Resources in the state had been postponed since last 31 March, and most of the articles of the second bill, which dealt with the prevention of communicable diseases, included medical and technical terms.

It seems that these expectations were not right. The session which was calm during its first hour exploded suddenly and turned into heated and emotional debates, especially between the minister of agriculture and the speaker of the council. The debates were about the appointment of a secretary general or a general manager for the organization. In fact, Tarim 'Umran considered the establishment of the organization to be tantamount to an announcement of a new ministry strengthening the expansion of the civil service system in the state. Following the vote, which was against the appointment of a secretary general for the organization, the minister of agriculture declared that he was abstaining from the vote and that he was giving up in front of the National Council his responsibility to head the organization.

In contrast with that, the council's debate on the communicable diseases bill lasted no more than 15 minutes, whereas reading the articles of the bill lasted about 1 hour. After making a few amendments to the bills the Council approved both bills in its session in which the government was represented by the ministers of agriculture and health.

Details of the Session

The session was called to order by Tarim 'Umran Tarim, speaker of the Council. After apologies were read and the minutes of the previous session were approved, the Council moved on to review the item of incoming letters. This included a letter from member Salih al-Shal regarding disbursing loans for establishing citizens' housing.

The letter stated that Articles 27 and 28 of the federal bill establishing the Real Estate Bank stipulated that the National Housing Board be abolished and that its rights and obligations be turned over to the Real Estate Bank. "Then we learned afterwards that the Council of Ministers did not approve the abolishment of the National Housing Board. Accordingly, we ask that you inform us whether or not the funds allocated to grant citizens loans for building homes will be disbursed during the current 1981 fiscal year in accordance with the rules that have already been approved by the National Housing Board prior to the drafting of the Real Estate Bank Bill."

The speaker of the Council responded by [saying] that the secretariat general had not yet received any response from the minister of finance and industry regarding the letter and that it was still waiting for a reply.

The Bills

The item on bills coming from committees included two bills. The first bill pertained to protection against communicable diseases. That bill came from the Health Affairs, Labor and Social Affairs Committee. The second bill pertained to the establishment of the Supreme Organization for the Management of Water Resources in the State.

Despite the fact that according to the agenda the debate on the communicable diseases bill was to have preceded [the debate on other matters], an agreement was reached to begin the debate on the water bill because it had been postponed repeatedly for several sessions, each one of which the minister had attended.

At first, committee member, Muhammad ibn Badwah read the special report on the bill and the amendments that the committee had proposed. First among these amendments was one to change the organization's name from Supreme Organization to the Public Organization for Water Resources Management.

There was a lengthy debate around this subject that was begun by Sa'id al-Raqbani when he asked what the committee had in mind when it changed the organization's name to a public organization. He made it clear in this regard that the organization included deputy ministers and directors of federal and local water departments in addition to municipal representatives. It is thus regarded as an authority that serves a coordinating function for these organizations. Because of its importance it has been

linked directly to the prime minister. Consequently, it had to be a supreme organization.

The only member who supported the minister was Sayf Sultan. However, the member, Nasir Lawtah; al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-Jabbar al-Majid; and the speaker of the Council supported the committee's amendment.

They indicated that the term, public organization, was more capable of denoting the meaning of the organization than the term, supreme organization.

When the Council's legal adviser was asked to express his opinion on the matter, [he said], "When the committee asks that the name [of an organization] be changed, it does so not because it is fond of changing names, but rather because the matter pertains to technical terms. As a technical man I do not know what a supreme organization means unless I refer to its jurisdictions and its bylaws. But if I were to say public organization, the term means that it is an organization that pursues public services which are either economic or social. The term is clearer and more meaningful than [the term], supreme organization."

After this explanation the members agreed to postpone debate over the amendment until after the bill was read.

Pricing Policy

There was also an expanded debate when the deputy reporter of the committee read the text of Article 6 of the bill, one of whose sections stipulated the authorities and jurisdictions of the organization in proposing a water pricing policy for the purpose of curbing excessive water consumption.

The minister explained that in a country like the United Arab Emirates water was a national treasure and that it must, therefore, be preserved. He added that the pricing proposal would be carefully considered by the board of directors. He assured the members, "We will not send the farmers water bills every month, but our purpose is to curb the consumption which exceeds actual need."

Member Muhammad al-'Amiri suggested that the paragraph be amended so as to delete [the term], "pricing policy" and have the text read, "water policy for the purpose of curbing useless consumption."

Faraj ibn Hammudah proposed that the paragraph should read, "A water policy that would require the owner of a farm to restrict himself on his farm to actual water consumption by installing special meters that determine the quantity of water consumed by the farmer and whether or not that quantity actually exceeded his needs." This is the case in numerous countries. It is done to preserve water resources for future generations. In case the farmer does [not] abide by this, he may be penalized by having seeds or machines withheld from him.

The member, Jabr Sayf cut in to the debate and said, "The farmer will not accept in any case that water prices be imposed on the water he pumps out of his own land. There are no laws similar to this in the neighbouring countries."

The speaker of the Council explained that the farmer, for the sake of his farm, will naturally not waste his water. The farmer knows what his real consumption is, and he knows that excessive use of water will have a negative effect on his agricultural production or his basic means of support.

The member, Mohammed al-Muaa proposed that violators be fined. But Nasir Lutah said that the organization was established to help farmers and that setting a price for water constituted a barrier to increasing production and that it would help raise the prices of agricultural products.

After these debates the floor was given to the minister of agriculture who said, "The matter is not so serious as to take up so much of the members' debate time, as I said this matter is related not only to the Ministry of Agriculture, but it is also related to other specialized organizations such as the Ministry of Electricity and Water and local water departments. We are facing numerous and real problems, beginning with the problems of the soils where depletion has begun. Then there are problems of increased salinity in fresh water. This is in addition to the spatiality of water sources and a multitude of competent authorities."

He added; "I want to assure you also that no such chaos in water consumption has occurred in the world as has occurred in the Arab Emirates. Nowhere in the world can any farmer dig a well unless he has obtained a permit with field specifications from a designated organization. But in the Emirates, the drills are being operated in numerous areas of the country and the permits are issued wholesale by the authorized agencies. Consequently, water is wasted without any supervision."

The speaker of the Council cut in the debate and proposed that the paragraph be amended so it would read "proposing a water monitoring policy for the purpose of curbing excessive consumption."

The Board of Directors

The Council moved on to debate Article 7 which stipulates that the organization's Board of Directors be chaired by the minister of agriculture and that its members be the deputy ministers of agriculture, electricity and planning; the secretary general of the municipalities; and two directors of local water departments. The committee has requested in its amendment that the board of directors include all the directors of local water departments so as to ensure the representation of all these departments on the organization's board of directors. The minister announced that he had no objection to that despite the fact that the bill stipulated that the board consist of seven members only.

The water and fishing debates changed suddenly when the Council came to

Article 16 of the bill which stipulated that a secretary general for the organization be appointed by a decision of the chairman of the board of directors according to a recommendation from the board of directors.

The minister added that a paragraph be added to the bill, which had come originally from the government, stipulating that the secretary general be appointed by a decision of the Council of Ministers and that he have the rank of deputy minister.

The session began to heat up when the speaker of the Council asked what was the philosophy in general behind establishing the organization. Was it established to increase the number of public organizations in the state or to strengthen the current expansion of the civil service? He said, "I am personally not quite convinced by this philosophy. If a special agency were to be formed in one of the ministries, that would be more feasible than the establishment of the organization."

The debates became more heated when the minister responded to the speaker of the Council [by saying that] the Council had the right to debate the bill and that if the Council and its speaker were not convinced, they can return the bill to the government. Then he raised a number of questions and answered them [himself]. The replies can be summarized [as follows]: water was being wasted without the supervision of a single agency, and the law would link all these competent agencies to each other.

Tarim responded by saying that he did not object to the law itself, but rather to the formation of the organization which will be tantamount to a new ministry with its army of civil servants.

The minister replied [by saying] that he personally had not asked for the establishment of this organization, but that there were serious and urgent problems which had led him to submit a memorandum to the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers requested that the organization be formed so as to protect and develop the water sources. We held numerous meetings, and then we came up with a bill with the help of UN experts and experts from countries that are suffering from water problems like us."

The debate became even more heated when the member, Nasir Lutah said, "This organization is not a political organization. Accordingly, it does not need a secretary general; it rather needs a general manager." He was supported in this by the speaker of the Council who said, "The question is not one of inflated titles as much as it is one of accomplishing specific tasks."

And here the minister replied, "Then leave the matter, and I will bring it up with the prime minister." But the speaker of the Council objected to that and said, "We have the right as a national council to debate the bill and the amendment to it before turning it over to any other agency."

The minister then went back to explain that his statements did not in any case mean intruding on the powers of the National Council, but that

they meant that the powers of the secretary general were mostly more powerful and more flexible than ''one of a general manager. "Also, the board of directors will meet only once every 3 months, and this explains our need for a secretary general who has the quality of flexibility."

"Retortion"

When the floor was given to al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Majid, he said, "The rank of the secretary general should be lower than that of the directors of major departments, but the minister's proposal that the secretary general be appointed with the rank of a deputy minister would make him outrank the members (of the board of directors). How can he take instructions from the directors when he outranks them? This is actually clear opposition."

"The Vote"

After the debate became disrupted, Jasim 'Umran asked that the matter be settled by vote. The outcome was 11 for appointing a general manager and 9 votes in favor of the government.

In view of this outcome the minister declared that he would take this matter under advisement, and he said, "I am giving up my responsibility to head the organization in front of the National Council." The speaker of the Council replied, "This must be done in front of the government and not in front of the Council."

"Communicable Diseases"

The debate on the federal bill regarding protection from communicable diseases lasted no more than 15 minutes, whereas the reading of the bill, which has 31 articles, lasted over 1 hour.

With the exception of a few simple observations, the Council stopped only at Article 28 of the bill which permits the minister to form specialized medical committees to perform medical examinations on those who come into the country to determine whether or not they are free of all or some communicable diseases.

The committee requested in its report that a paragraph be added stipulating that a person coming to the Emirates to work may not be allowed to enter into the country until he submits a certificate from the authorized medical authority with which he is affiliated. That certificate, which should be endorsed by the consulate of the Emirates abroad, [would state] that he was free of dangerous diseases.

It was the opinion of the majority of the members that the article as set forth by the government was more feasible since we do not have embassies and consulates in numerous countries from which we import labor, and especially southeast Asia.

The minister of health explained that the ministry will begin by evaluating the work of the health organizations and their handling of communicable diseases in preparation for carrying out intense media campaigns. He said, "A health card from abroad may be forged. Consequently, we have decided that early next year we will establish centers in various areas of the state to conduct full medical examinations for all those working in government and private organizations, and we will issue the workers certificates proving that they are free from communicable diseases." The minister made it clear that there was an agreement with the Ministry of Labor that no worker would be given residence unless he had a health certificate [obtained] after he began work in the Emirates.

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DIRHAM LIQUIDITY CRISIS FEARED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 25, 22 Jun 81 p 5

[Text]

The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED) more than doubled its loan and grant disbursements last year as the Emirate's oil revenue soared by 47 per cent over the 1979 level. In its annual report, released recently, ADFAED said it had disbursed a total of Dirhams 1.1 billion ($300 million) in 1980 compared to Dirhams 506 million ($138 million) in 1979, while UAE Central Bank statistics indicated that 1980 oil revenues reached Dirhams 72 billion ($20 billion) against Dirhams 49 billion ($13.6 billion) in 1979.

The record revenues in 1980 were made possible by the OPEC price increases decided at the end of 1979 and despite a fall in output from 533 million bbl in that year to 495 million bbl in 1980. Abu Dhabi is the largest oil-producing state of the seven-member UAE, which had an annual output of 627 million bbl of oil last year, down 50 million bbl from the 1979 level.

The next biggest producer is Dubai, whose output fell by only 1 million bbl last year to 128 million, while the UAE's third and smallest producer, Sharjah, had an output of 3.8 million bbl, compared to 5 million bbl in 1979.

ADFAED last year assisted projects ranging from a Dirham 4 million ($1 million) fishery scheme in the Cape Verde Islands to a Dirham 100 million ($27 million) petrochemical plant in Turkey.

The Central Bank figures showed that Japan headed the list of importers of UAE oil, contributing to 33.9 per cent of the Emirates' oil earnings; France came second, providing 11.6 per cent of oil revenues followed by the US with 9.8 per cent, The Netherlands, 6.4 per cent, West Germany, 5.5 per cent and Britain, 3.3 per cent. Remaining revenue (27.5 per cent) was provided by a variety of small importers.

An astonishing figure for UAE revenues from LNG and associate gas sales goes unexplained by the Central Bank report, which says that 1980 earnings from these sales came to Dirhams 2.2 billion ($625.6 million) compared to Dirhams 4.63 billion ($1.26 billion) in 1979. No official statistics have been published on the UAE's gas production and export levels so far, but it can be inferred that if the figures quoted above are correct, the problems at the [illegible] gas liquefaction plant on Das Island are serious indeed.

Ever since it first came on stream, the Das Island liquefaction complex has suffered from technical problems which led to 1980 production at less than 65 per cent capacity of 2.2 million tons a year of LNG and 1.2 million tonnes of natural gas liquids. Some of the production problems have been due to a shortage of storage space which has led the Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company (ADGLC) to commision a $500 million storage tank complex from the US firm Pullman Kellog.

All of the UAE's gas exports go to Japan under a 20-year contract with ADGLC.

CSO: 4300/24

BRIEFS

SOLAR DESALINATION PLANT--Japan has completed the construction of a solar-powered desalination plant which will be installed in the UAE before the end of the year, the UAE's official WAM news agency reports. In a report from Al-Ain, WAM quoted the Japanese Ambassador, Nobure Nakahira, as saying that the plant cost about Dh 25 million ($7 million) and that it was capable of desalinating 100 tons of sea-water per day. Mr Nakahira, who was speaking after confering with the Chairman of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, Sheikh Tahnoun bin Mohammed, added that the plant would be shipped from Japan once a suitable location had been found for it in the UAE. Sheikh Tahnoun is also the representative of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi in the eastern part of the emirate. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 25, 22 Jun 81 p 10]

$50 MILLION SHOPPING CENTRE--The government of Abu Dhabi is expected to invite tenders in October for a $50 million market project to be constructed on a 15-hectare site in the centre of the capital city. The Town Planning Department has appointed White Young Emirates as principal consultants and project managers following an international competition held last year. The scheme will include a two-floor main market area of more than 55,500 square metres connected by open walkways to a separate, single-storey, 6,014 sqm vegetable market. A mosque holding about 300 people will be situated between the two markets. The main area will house 700 shopping units, four banks, two coffee shops, four children's play areas and internal courtyards with fountains. There will also be a centralised air-cooling system. Buildings will be concrete-framed, with 26-metre domes, 14 metres in diameter, barrel vault roofs and wind towers to cool the walkways. Concrete arches, 18 metres high, will support the main entrance canopies. The whole project will be surrounded by gardens and will have a parking lot with space for more than 1,000 cars. The design team includes architects Fletcher Ross and Hickling, White Young Consulting Engineers, White Young Prentice Royle and quantity surveyors Langdon Every. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 25, 22 Jun 81 pp 5, 6]

DH-13 BILLION FIVE-YEAR PLAN--Abu Dhabi, June 25 (WAM): The federal government expenditure for the UAE first five-year plan (1981-85) is estimated at Dh. 13 billion, Director-General of Budget Department in the Ministry of Finance and Industry Abdul Hakeen Al Banai said. He added that the federal budget for 1981 included an allocation of Dh. 2550 million for new projects and completion of projects whose implementation started earlier. Banai said that allocations were also approved for completing some important and urgent projects. The Cabinet has allocated Dh. 110 million to solve the problem of Ras Al Khaimah electricity shortage by construction of a new station, he added. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 26 Jun 81 p 3]

CENTRAL BANK DEPOSITS INCREASE--Abu Dhabi, June 26 (WAM): According to the Central Bank's economic review the bank's deposits including government deposits totalled 27.2 billion dirhams in 1980 compared to 21.1 billion dirhams in 1979, registering an increase of 6.1 billion dirhams. The increase reflects the clients' desire to hold dirhams in long-term bank deposits because of the increase in the dirham value against the American dollar during the past three years. The review expects that in view of the UAE oil returns and foreign surpluses the dirham will continue to remain stable and strong and the deposits will continue to grow and increase. The review added that the dirham term deposits constituted 54.7 per cent of the total term deposits in December 1980 compared to 41.7 per cent in December 1979. It added that term deposits in foreign exchange or in dirhams which total five million dirhams and more were not subject to the interest maximum level. Therefore, such term deposits, which get interest of 12 per cent and more, were doubled and constituted 42 per cent of the total deposits in December 1980 compared to 22 per cent in 1979. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 27 Jun 81 p 3]

GDP PROJECTIONS--Abu Dhabi, June 26 (WAM): The UAE Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is projected to reach 135.3 billion dirhams by 1985 compared to 111.5 billion dirhams already registered in 1980, an economic review of the first five-year plan 1981-1985 said. The national income is expected to reach 125.4 billion dirhams compared to 98.7 billion dirhams in 1980. The review added that the maximum consumption in 1980 totalled 31 billion dirhams and is projected to reach 50 billion dirhams in 1985. The governmental maximum consumption in 1980 reached 12 billion dirhams and is expected to reach 21 billion dirhams in 1985. Family consumption amounted to 19 billion dirhams in 1980 and is expected to reach 29 billion dirhams in 1985. According to the review the state's goods import in 1980 reached 34 billion dirhams and in 1985 is projected to reach 37 billion dirhams. In 1980 goods export amounted to 85 billion dirhams and is expected to register 88 billion dirhams in 1985. The state's balance of trade registered a surplus of 50 billion dirhams in 1980 and is expected to show some simple fluctuations and to reach 50.5 billion dirhams in 1985. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 27 Jun 81 p 3]

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